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The term ideology may be used to describe either com-
munism or nationalism. Both are essentially belief systems
which consist of a particular mode of thought and result in
a unique manner of viewing reality. Both the communist and
nationalist offer ready solutions to complex problems, claim
prophetic abilities and promise improvement in the human con-
dition. Both political theories exhibit the common, ideologi-
cal characteristic of reinforcement, i.e. their adherents
tend to interpret events in such a way as to strengthen their
faith in the system whether the actual phenomena are, in fact,
compatible with that system or not. As is usually the case
with ideologies, they are also mutually exclusive. Whereas
the communist would improve matters through changes in human
nature aimed at the eventual homogenization of mankind, the
nationalist hopes to achieve better conditions or maintain
the status cuo by either preserving the differences which
exist between his and other nationalities or offering others
the apparent benefits of his own system. The communist promises
that the world-wide acceptance of his political theory will
result in the removal of all material deprivation and predicts
an end to international and local strife. The nationalist, on
the other hand, offers greater wealth and the protection of
the interests of his own peoole either through achieving or

maintaining national independence.
The incompatible nature of these two ideologies would
warrant the conclusion that the nationalist and communist
would be inalterably opposed. In a world system of nation-
states, based on nationalistic motives, a great power which
had adopted the communist ideology would theoretical!;/ be
forced to conduct its foreign polic;/ in a most inimical en-
vironment. In fact, the Soviet Union with its communist ide-
ology finds allies and the communism gains adherents among
the strongly nationalistic peoples of Asia, Africa and South
America.
There are many reasons for this apparent contradiction.
The recognition of the bolshevik regime by other governments,
admission of the U.S.S.R. to the League of Nations and the
subsequent recognition of the satellite regimes together with
their admission to the United Nations have all served to con-
fer historical legitimacy on communist states and minimize
the dangers to the national independence of others. Many eco-
nomically backward nationalities look to the U.S.S.R. as a
successful, developing country in- contrast to those who have
already reached an advanced stage of development. The afflu-
ence of many western states, flagrantly advertised in commo-
dity sales promotion, and the relatively lower standard of
living enjoyed in the Soviet Union tend to polarize economic

issues into a seeming alliance of rich against poor. Western
aid efforts, although occassionally well planned and executed,
are frequently unable to generate a sufficiently rarid change
to meet the aspirations of people with serious economic prob-
lems.
The causes mentioned above may be categorized as exter-
nalities in the sense th p t the?/ all function in such a x^ay as
to create a favorable environment for Soviet foreign policy
efforts at minimizing the disparity between their own system
and the aspirations of the nationalist. These endeavors in-
clude support of independence movements on a selective basis,
an economic assistance orogram in opposition to western aid
activities, and a massive propaganda offensive designed to
nullify any amicable attitudes toward the West while simul-
taneously presenting the Soviet Union as the champion of the
weak and oppressed. Animosity toward the western powers is
generated through repetitious accusations of capitalistic im-
perialism and neo-colonialism. The benevolence of the Soviet
Union is demonstrated by issuing proclamations in support of
national independence and freedom of self-determination. The
charges of capitalistic exploitation are often accepted in
underdeveloped nations since they provide a ready explanation
for the economic ills found there. Self-determination is pre-
cisely the political commodity which the nationalist seeks.

These two propaganda themes result in an effective and ver-
satile policy tool.
There have been many studies published on Soviet na-
tionality policies. Some authors investigate the history of
the U.S.S.R. in its dealings with minority peoples and les-
ser nations. Others take the theoretical approach and examine
the Marxist-Leninist doctrines on the subject. However, I
would argue that these works suffer from a common weakness.
This should not be construed as a deficiency of scholarly
application or incisive analysis. The problem lies in the
need for evaluation and measurement against a standard. Since
the yardstick for choosing and judging events or doctrinal
statements is usually the value system of the author, his ar-
guments and conclusions often loose their persuasive force
when considered by individuals whose value orientation dif-
fers. For this reason, the following essay pursues a separate
course. I have attempted the comparison of a model of the na-
tionalists' ideology with the chronological development of
the communist ideology. This system is by no means novel in
any way other than the choice of subject for its application.
Karl Mannheim was, to the best of my knowledge, its founder.
Employed correctly, its advantages lie in the lessening of
-'-Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New. York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1951)

the number of value- judgements made on the basis of the
author's own philosophy alone and by highlighting the occa-
sions when such decisions are made out of necessity.
The purpose of the essay, as already implied, is to
dispel the illusion that there is any similarity between the
two plans for advancing human welfare even though the com-
munist doctrine has been ncriodically modified in order to
permit a wide variety of apparent concessions to the nationa-
list. These nominal concessions, which arise from necessity
or expediency, disap-oear whenever the political environment




The Marxist Theory of Nationalism
The word nationalism has been used to describe a great
many movements including patriotism, imperialism and racism.
This varied usage, together with the fact that nationalism
has been extolled and condemned, requires some clarification
of the term. Boyd C. Shs.fer has analyzed the classical and
more recent scholarly works devoted to the subject. Shafer
concludes that there are ten, common, identifiable charac-
teristics of nationalism and lists them as follows:
1. A certain defined (often vaguely) unit of terri-
tory (whether possessed or coveted)
.
2 Some common cultural characteristics such as
language (or widely understood languages),
cust'Tis, manners and literature (folk tales
and lore are e beginning) . If an individual
believes he shares these, and wishes to con-
tinue sharing them, he is usually said to be
a member of the nationality.
3. Some common dominant social (as Christian)
and economic (as capitalistic or recently com-
munistic) institutions.
ij.. A common independent or sovereign government
(type does not matter) or the desire for one.
The "principle" that each nationality should
be separate end independent is involved here.
5>. A belief in a common history (it can be in-
vented) and in a common origin (often mista-
kenly conceived to be racial in nature)
.
6. A love or esteem for fellow nationals (not
necessarily as individuals).

7. A devotion to the entity (however little com-
prehended) called the nation, which embodies
the common territory, culture, social and eco-
nomic institutions, government, and the fel-
low nationals, and which is at the same time
(whether organism or not) more than their sum.
8. A common pride in the achievements (often the
military more than the cultural) of this na-
tion and a common sorrow in its tragedies
(particularly its defeats).
9. A disregard for or hostility to other (not
necessarily all) like groups, especially if
these prevent or seem to threaten the sepa-
rate national existence.
10. A hope that the nation will have a great and
glorious future (usually in territorial ex-
pansion) and become supreme in some way (in
world power if the nation is already large). *
With these characteristics as an aid, nationalism may be
broadly defined as thr opinion that the "people, language,
culture and tradition of one's own nationality are of an
equal or preferable quality to those of others and that the
nationality should therefore exist as a separate entity and
freely determine its own destiny. This is the conceot of the
nationalist ideology employed for pur-coses of comparison in
the remainder of this essay.
The Marxist theory places opinions and ideas of this
type, along with all others, in the category of socio-ooliti-
1Boyd C. Shafer, "Toward a Definition of Nationalism"
in James N. Rosenau, Ed., International Politics and Joreign
Policy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. , 1961)
pp. 301-313.

8cal superstructure which arises from a particular type of
economic mode of production. An understanding of this rela-
tionship between perception and the production of physical
goods is essential in order to grasp the nature of the basic
conflict between nationalism and communism.
When Marx rejected the idealist philosophy of Hegel
and embraced materialism, it was necessary that he explain
the material source of ideas. His answers, set forth in The
German Ideology
,
may be briefly summarized in the following
manner,^ jn order for primitive man to continue to exist, it
was necessary that he fulfill the physical demands which
existence dictated. These needs were of two types. Man re-
quired food, clothing and shelter and, at the same time, it
was necessary for him to begin to propagate. In satisfying
these two conditions, man developed a dual relationship, one
with nature, the other with his fellow men. The second, re-
productive relationship was itself a productive force in that
consciousness and language were derived from it. Marx taught
that it was this consciousness which distinguished man from
animals who had no similar awareness of their relationship
with others of their species. Even in man, this primitive ccn-
2Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961].) Chapter I entitled "P'euer-
bach" contains the explanation of the ideal, the alienation of
man and the source of national differences.

sciousness was, at first, only of a sheep-like or tribal
kind. Its further development resulted from increased pro-
ductivity, increased needs and, what was essential to both,
the corresponding increase in population. This evolutionary
process continued until the additional complexity of the so-
cial relationship had generated a sufficient productive force
for man's mind to conceive something without conceiving some-
thing which existed in the material world. Consciousness,
thus freed from the physical, was then capable of proceeding
to pure theory and forming a social superstructure of ethics,
law, religion, government, etc.
The preceeding explanation of man's abstract abilities
offers no reasons for any disparity in ideas. Marx resolved
this problem with a parallel, dialectical argument. He stated
that while consciousness was evolving from the social relation-
ship, the production of sustenance had also undergone change.
Because of natural predisposition, strength or dexterity, la-
bor had become specialized. Some men became shepherds or far-
mers while others hunted or fished. This division of labor
meant that man became an interdependent rather than a self-
sufficient entity. 3 This mutual reliance on others of the
3Solomon F. Bloom describes the Marxist teaching on the
basic similarities and superstructural differences of mankind
in his book, The World of Nations (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, la Ij.l) Chn s . 1 and Z t Bloom uses the categories of





group, which Marx called Communal interest
,
inevitably con-
flicted with the interests of the individual or family and
resulted in alienation. The first, true division of labor
occurred when mental and physical activities devolved on
different individuals. Prom then on, one or another group
of reasoning specialists in the community would sieze con-
trol of the means for production of the basic goods and do-
minate it in order to promote their interests with the con-
sequent exploitation of the remainder of the community. Since
this ruling class controlled the means of physical production,
they would also be able to dominate the social relationships
and, consequently, the production of ideas. The ide^s would
become those of the rulers and pave the way for further con-
flicts. The ideal world would remain under the sway of the
rulers and develop according to their wishes. Meanwhile the
mode of physical production x^ould undergo change and continue
to progress until a contradiction resulted between the new
mode of production and the ideas of the old ruling class. The
entire social relationship would become a hindrance to further
advances in the production of commodities. Marx summarized
this historical progression in the introduction to his Con-
tribution to the Critique of the Political Fconotiy
.
"in the social production which men carry on they
enter into definite relations that are indispen-
sable and independent of their will, these, rela-
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tions of production correspond to a definite
stage of development of their material powers
of production. The sum total of these rela-
tions of production constitutes the economic
structure of society - the real foundation,
on which rise legal and political superstruc-
tures and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness. The mode of produc-
tion in materiel life determines the general
character of the social, political and spiri-
tual processes of life. It is not the con-
sciousness of men that determines their exist-
ence, but on the contrary, their social exist-
ence determines their consciousness. At a cer-
tain stage of their development, the material
forces of production in society come into con-
flict with the existing relations of production,
or - what is but a legal expression for the same
thing - with the oroperty relations within which
they had been at x^ork before. From forms of de-
velopment of the forces of production these re-
lations turn into their fetters. "![.
The retarding influences of the social relationships would
eventually result in the overthrow of the old rulers by those
who were able to dominate under the new conditions of produc-
tion. As production methods improved, similar situations re-
peatedly and inevitably arose. These cycles served to explain
all of man's history up to the time when Marx discovered the
laws of social behavior (-ore-historical period).
5
^-Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy (New York: The International Library Publishing Co.,
19014.) pp. 11-12.
-^According to Marx, -productive methods inevitably improved
as man's needs increased. These evolutions took olace natural-
ly, i.e., they were not subordinate to the general plan of free-
ly combined individuals. Until a communal plan could be executed
in the interest of all individuals, periodic revolutions would
occur (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 88-91).
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The same conflicts of interest which caused differences
of opinion and class struggle within a community also account-
ed for inter-community discord. Just as the socio-political
superstructure of a group of people inevitably came into con-
tradiction with "the economic base of that group, the super-
structures of various peoples would also conflict. This was
caused by differences in the mode of physical production in
dissimilar locales. Because of the diverse, natural, environ-
mental conditions, the manner in which man procurred the phy-
sical necessities of life would contrast and result in the
domination by heterogeneous classes. For example, capitalism
and the corresponding domination of the bourgeoisie class
could only occur in temperate crimes." Conversely, the na-
tural abundance of the tropics would preclude the necessary
initiative for advancement to a modern industrial mode of
production. Since the various peoples hed dissimilar economic
bases and were dominated by various classes, their superstruc-
tures also differed.
"The relations of different nations among them-
selves depends upon the extent to which each
has developed its productive forces, the divi-
sions of labour and internal intercourse. "7
f
'Karl Marx, Capital (Chicago, 111.: Charles H. Kerr and
Company, 1909) Vol. I, yy. 562-£6£.






Because the ruling class interests dominated, they were pro-
moted as the national interests. Marx's central preoccupation
with the process of domination explains his lack of precision
in the usage of the terms nation, nationality, state, country
and society. All could be used to indicate a group of -peoples
whose mode of production had led to domination by a class
along with the ideas of that class. This same idea of class
struggle and domination was the foundation of Marxist inter-
national theory. The ruling classes of nations with an ad-
vanced mode of production eventually dominated less progres-
sive countries and exploited them as they did their own
people.
Although careless in the use of terminology, Marx
took considerable pains to outline the way in which the con-
flicts between nations arose. According to his theory, this
contradiction was a slow and gradual development and the ad-
vent of manufacture marked its beginnings." When the guilds
of the feudal system gave way to manufacture and the manu-
facturing middle class, trade took on a political signifi-
es
cance. 7 The conflicting interests of the various peoples were






raents in technology exacerbated these antagonisms. Beginning
in the middle of the seventeenth century, commerce and navi-
gation began to outstrip manufacture and colonies were founded,
which became consumers. As a result, the competitive struggle
among the more civilized nations increased. The rise of
machine production made the competition even more fierce. A
modern, industrial mode of production created the most severe
contradictions of any previous historical epoch.
"Finally, modern industry and the opening of the
world market made the struggle universal and at
the same time gave it an unheard-of virulence.
Advantages in natural or artificial conditions
of production now decide the existence or non-
existence of individual capitalist, as well as
of whole industries and countries. He that falls
is remorselessly cast aside. "11
While these advances in the mode of production were occurring,
there were corresponding shifts in the socio-political super-
structures. Some nations became centralized and others were
subjugated.
"Just as it [bourgeois ie^j has made the country
dependent on the towns, so it has made barba-
rian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on
the civilized ones, nations of neasants on na-
tions of bourgeoisie, the East on the West.
More and more the bourgeoisie Continues to do
away with the scattered state of population,
means of production, and property. It has ag-
1 Ibid.
, pp. 72-73
•^Friedrich Engels, Socialism: Utordan and Scientific in
Arthur P. Mendel, Ed., Fssenti-1 .vorks of Marxism (New York/
Toronto/London: Bantam Books, 1%1) p. 70.
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glomerated population, centralized means of
production, and concentrated property in a
fevj hands. The necessary consequence of this
x%ras political centralization. Independent,
or but loosely connected, provinces with se-
parate interests, laws, governments and sy-
stems or taxation, became lumped together
into one netion, with one government, one
code of laws, one national class-interest,
one frontier end one customs-tariff . "12
Marx also described how the bourgeoisie gained their ruling
class position and just hoitf thorough their domination was.
"Each step in the development of the bour-
geoisie was accompanied by a corresponding
political advance of that class. An oppressed
class under the sway of the feudal nobility,
an armed and self-governing association in
the medieval commune. At first, an indepen-
dent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany)
or a taxable "third estate" of the monarchy
(as in France), afterwards, in the period of
manufacture proper, serving either the semi-
feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counter-
poise against the nobility, and, in fact,
cornerstone of the great monarchies in ge-
neral, the bourgeoisie has at last, since
the establishment of modern industry and of
the world market, conquered for itself, in
the modern representative State, exclusive
political sway. The executive of the modern
State is but a committee for managing the
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. "13
At this point, with only the investigation of Marx's
basic ideas on nations and international conflict completed,
there are several doctrines with which the nationalist could
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Com-




not agree. Recalling Shafer's listing which was quoted ear-
lier, the contradictions become quite evident. If the Marxist
theory is accepted, the nationalist belief in common culture,
language, custom, manner and literature is purely illusory.
These devices are only methods which present or former rulers
have fashioned, through the control of the production of ideas,
in order to maintain a oortion of the nationality in a depen-
dent role. Furthermore, any change in the economic system
will result in their loss when the entire superstructure shifts.
The same may be said for common social institutions such as
religions or tribal bonds. Belief in a common origin and his-
tory or pride in national achievements must also be interpre-
ted as foolishness. Marx taught that mankind began as a mass
of individuals x^ithout any significant differentiation. Distinc-
tions eventually resulted from purely environmental conditions
which caused variations in the division of labor. History, un-
til Marx's discoveries, was a series of inevitable occurrences
which man had no means to control. The past national achieve-
ments of any but a socialistically directed country had to
have resulted on a similar non-volitional basis. One can hard-
ly take pride in accidents.
There is one further consideration. Marx's argument casts
the nationalist himself in a most unfavorable role. If a mem-
ber of an economically advanced nation, he is, by drfinition,
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of the oppressor, bourgeoisie class. If his nation is back-
x^ard or oppressed, the nationalist is then a. member of some
former ruling class who is seeking to restore his dominant
position over his fellow nationals. There are no other roles
available in the Marxist script.
The arguments presented here are all based on doctrines
which have not and indeed can never be abandoned by those who
adhere to the Marxist teachings. The entire communist ideolo-
gy crumbles if any of the dogmas such as the division of labor,
the alienation of man, the association of economic base and
superstructure or the class struggle are removed. This fact
casts serious coubt on the validity of any communist recog-
nition of national independence or self-determination and on-





The Marxist theory attributes all exploitation and
resultant hardship to the division of labor and the conse-
quent class struggles. The problem could be eliminated by
doing away with the division and Marx taught that the same,
modern industry which had caused the serious nature of the
conflict also contained the elements of the solution.
The bourgeoisie was causing the homogenization of na-
tionalities in their efforts at extending their industrial
mode of production to all corners of the world.
"National differences and antagonisms between
peoples are daily more end more vanishing,
owing to the development of the bourgeoisie,
to freedom of commerce, to the world market,
to uniformity in the mode of -production and
in the conditions of life corresponding there-
to. "1
This passage and the famous statement that the workingman has
no country are frequently cited as evidence that Marx was un-
concerned with national issues. In light of the works reviewed
earlier in this essay and subsequent paragraphs of the Commu-
nist Manifesto itself, such an inference is not only unfounded
but leads to misinterpretation of Marx's revolutionary strate-
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Com-
munist party
, p. 28. A modern mode of -production was able to
negate the natural, environmental conditions which had caused
the earlier, uneven development of production since modern in-
dustry signified man*s domination of nature e "Tn proportion as
industry advances, natural limits recede." (Karl Marx, Capital
,
Vol. Ill, p. 565)
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gy. The spread of a single mode of production might result
in similarities among the cultural, social and political super-
structures of various nations but, so long as the division
of labor remained, the bourgeoisie x^ould continue to promote
their class interests through the state governments they con-
trolled and these interests would conflict with the bourgeoi-
sie interests of other nntions.
"Generally speaking, big industry created every-
where the same relations between the classes of
society, and thus destroyed the peculiar indi-
viduality of the various nationalities. And fi-
nally, while the bourgeoisie of each nation
still retained seo'arste national interests , big
industry created a class, which in all nations
has the same interest and with which nationali-
ty is already dead; a class which is really rid
of all the old world and at the same time stands
pitted against it. Big industry makes for the
worker not only the relation to the capitalist,
but labour itself, unbearable. "2
It was this homogeneous class, the proletariat, which was to
sieze control of modern industry and operate it for the bene-
fit of the workers. Then the mode of production would be
operating in the interests of the total community (all those
who worked) for the first time since the primitive tribal
period and the division of labor would be ended.
The fact that the bourgeoisie retained their differen-
ces provided the unified proletariat with a divided enemy in
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German ideology
,
p. 76. My italics.
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the revolutionary struggle. Bourgeois inter-nation struggles
also resulted in opportunities for the political education of
the proletarian class,
"The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a con-
stant battle. At first with the aristocracy;
later, with those portions of the bourgeoisie
itself, whose interest have become antagonistic
to the progress of industry; at all times, with
the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all
these battles it sees itself compelled to ap-
peal to the proletariat, to ask for its help,
and thus, to drag it into the political arena.
The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies
the proletariat with its own elements of po-
litical and general education, in other words,
it furnishes the nroletariat x^ith weaoons for
fighting the bourgeoisie, "3
Marx did not picture an army of West European workers attack-
ing first one and then another national bourgeoisie e The re-
volutionary battle was to be fought out within the national
framework, e.g. German against German, Englishman against
Englishman.
"Though not in substance, yet in form, the
struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoi-
sie is at first a national struggle. The pro-
letariat of each country must, of course, first
of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. "I4.
The national character of the revolutionary struggle received
further clarification.







"Since the proletariat must first of all
acquire political supremacy, must rise to
be the leading class of the nation, must
constitute itself the nation, it is to
this extent itself national, though not
in the bourgeois sense of the word. "5
It is quite clear that Marx was predicting a country by
country battle. This fact is, at first, quite surprising
since it appears to remove any advantage gained from the
carefully constructed argument for a divided bourgeoisie.
If the Marxist interpretation of man's early history is ac-
cepted, his demand for an intra-national revolution seems
self-contradictory. Previous changes in ruling classes sup-
posedly had resulted from advances in the mode of production,
Since the bourgeoisie class was the one which dominated with
a modern, industrial base, they should have continued to do-
minate until some new and advanced mode arose. Marx provided
the answer to this problem. The proletariat required an in-
ternational coordinating committee, the communist party, to
present the bourgeoisie with a united front,
"The Communists are distinguished from the
other working-class parties by this only:
1. In the national struggles of the prole-
tarians of the different countries, they
point out and bring to the fore the common
interests of the entire proletariat, inde-
- pendent of all nationality. 2, In the va-




the struggle of the working class against
the bourgeoisie has to -pass, they always
and everywhere represent the interests of
the movement as a whole. "6
The emphasis placed on the national nature of the re-
volutionary struggle was not to be interpreted as advocating
a sequential revolutionary progression. In order for the
dictatorship of the -oroletariat to become permanent, it would
have to be established more or less simultaneously in se-
veral of the advanced countries. Unless this happened, the
newly established socialist states would lack a sufficient
pox^er base to defeat the forces of the greedy bourgeoisie
of the nations which failed to succumb. In a letter to Engeis
in 18^8, Marx wondered whether a socialist revolution of the
Western European nations would be successful or if it might
instead be crushed since the bourgeoisie elsewhere was still
on the ascendent. ? By 1882, in a letter to Kautsky, Engeis
had decided that once Europe and North America were reorganized
,
the resulting collossal power would be enough to achieve a
permanent success.
6Ibid., p# 22
'Karl Marx and Frederick Engeis, Selected Correspondence
I8k6-l895 (New York: International Publishers, 193k) Letter No.
l\Z t PP. 117-118.
Ibid.
,
Letter No. 177, p. 399
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The insistence that there was a need for a multi-na-
tional effort and the fact that some nations would not have
progressed sufficiently to generate the necessary, revolu-
tionary impetus raises two questions. First, what form would
the multi-national, inter-socialist organization take? Se-
cond, what was to be its relationship with the unreorganized
nations? Marx and Engels did not provide an answer to the
first of these problems although one was required since, ac-
cording to the theory, all differences would not have ceased
to exist at the time the revolution occurred. While they
stated that such national peculiarities were daily lessened
by the bourgeoisie, it was only the proletariat which would
complete the process after the revolt,
"The supremacy of the proletariat will cause
them Qiational differences]] to vanish still
faster
..,.,, In proportion as the exploita-
tion of one individual by another is put an
end to, the exploitation of one nation by
another will also be nut an end to. In pro-
portion as the antagonism between classes
xvithin the nation vanishes, the hostility of
one nation to another will come to an end, "9
Marx's followers were left to work out the final solution to
this problem.
The second question of post-revolutionary relationships
received a little more consideration. In his letter to Kautsky,
o
'Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Com-
munist Party, p. 23

*h
Engels states that defensive wars on the part of the socialist
countries will almost certainly be required because of exter-
nal bourgeois avarice. However, he goes on to say that offen-
sive struggles to extend the revolutionary influence would not
be necessary nor desirable since to do so would undermine the
ability of the new organization to attract others by example,
"Once Furope is reorganized, and North America
that will furnish such collossal power and
such an example thet the semi-civilized coun-
tries will follow in their wake of their own
accord. Economic needs alone will be respon-
sible for this One thing alone is cer-
tain: the victorious proletariat can force no
blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation
without undermining its own victory by so
doing. Which of course by no means excludes
defensive wars of various kinds, "10
The open conflict between the communist plan for the
abolition of man's injustice to man and the aspirations of
the nationalist are vividly disclosed in the previous pas-
sages. The nationalist is an enemy before the revolution oc-
curs and a subversive afterwards. Although the exact method
which the proletariat is to employ in sweeping away the last
vestiges of national differences is unexplained, there appears
to be only one conclusion. Since a violent revolution was ne-
cessary to unseat the national bourgeoisie to begin with, it
must be assumed thpt coersion by the proletariat xvould be ne-
10Karl Marx snd Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence
,
Letter No. 177, p. 399
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cessary to achieve the eradication of any remainder of the
old order.
Engels' speculation on the exemplary strength of the
new socialist structure and his exclusion of offensive acts
against o^d regimes seem to be self-contradictory. A hypothe-
tical situation will serve to demonstrate why. Assuming that
the party was to continue its education work in the unre-
formed countries and that the economic bases would continue
to inevitably advance, at some point in time one or another
of these nations would experience a revolutionary upheaval
similar to that which had taken place earlier in the estab-
lished socialist states. However, the proletarians of that
currently revolutionary nation would be subject to the in-
fluences of the other, remaining, bourgeois countries. Mean-
while Engels' exclusion of all but defensive war would tie
the socialist hands. Even if a good communist could bring
himself to allow this, it appears that the beneficience of
the socialist example would be subject to rather rapid ero-
sion. The alternative is to vieitf the proletariat as a united
body in both the "reorganized" and bourgeois nations. This
would allow the socialist states to attack any bourgeois
country in the name of "defense" of the proletariat. The pro-
spects for the nationalist, whether within the new socialist





As of 181l8 when The Communist Manifest o was published,
Marx and Engels had stated that the goal of the communist
party was to provide for -proletarian unity in the struggle
itfith the bourgeoisie. There had been no mention of a related
goal which involved the exacerbation of national antagonisms
in order to weaken the established regimes and accelerate
historical progress. However, Marx and Engels devoted much
of their writings to the promotion of precisely this type
of conflict during the subsequent two decades. Their efforts
at encouraging hostilities which could benefit the revolu-
tion included support for independence movements and attempts
to incite war. Both types of endeavor were conducted on a
highly selective basis. It was this very selectivity which
has led to much of the debate over Marxist policies concern-
ing national self-determination and war. Those who believe
that Marx and Engels favored national independence are able
to bolster their argument with many quotations. Their opro-
nents have an equal number of examples at their disposal. -*-
•^In addition to these two frequent and familiar areas
of contention, some authors argue that Marx and Engrls formu-
lated their policies on the brsis of German nationalism. S.F.
Bloom presents a convincing argument that such an interpre-
tation is unfounded. (S.F. Bloom, World of Nations , Chp. 7.)
Bloom contends that the Germanic peonies received as much cri-
ticism from Marx as most others.
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A similar situation exists on the issue of whether Marx was
a war monger or pacifist. The solution to this problem lies
in the fact that both schools of thought are partially cor-
rect. The overall relation between independence movements or
wars at a particular time and their predicted effect on the
status of the proletarian revolution \-Jere the factors which
Marx and Engels used in determining whether they favored such
events or not. There was no firm policy one x-/ay or the other.
Theirs was an entirely dialectical approach, A particular in-
dependence movement might be of benefit to the revolution to-
day and detrimental tomorrow. The same could be said of a
war. Although this ambivalence precludes any meaningful ar-
gument on whether Marx and Engels were pacifists or war mon-
gers etc., the determinants of their position on such matters
may be summarized as follows:
Independence Movements
A. Beneficial
1. Any movement which served to weaken a back-
ward, reactionary, feudal-aristocratic re-
gime without strengthening another similar
government.
2. Any movement which might result in bour-
geoisie ascendency in a backward state since
the growth of the proletariat ;^as dependent
upon bourgeoisie ascendency.
B. Detrimental
1. Movement's which strenghtened the aristo-
cracy of any feudal, backward nation.
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2. Disruptive movements in established cen-
tralized, bourgeois states since such ac-




1. wars involving industrially advanced states
against backward states.
2. Wars among the backward feudal states.
3. Wars in which advanced nations might ex-
tend their influence over backward nations.
B. Detrimental
Tl War's between industrially advanced states
which caused -proletarian disunity end
threatened destruction of modern industry.
2. Wars which might extend the influence of
feudal states.
Some examples of how Marx and Engels made use of these de-
terminants will serve to clarify and further explain them
as well as verify their accuracy since they are empirically
derived.
En els published a series of nine articles on the de-
bate over ratification of the partition of Poland by the
G-erman National Assembly in I81i8. These articles appeared in
the newspaper Neue Rheinische Zeitung
.
The third of the se-
ries, published on August 19, contains his analysis of the
c Irish Independence from England, which Marx eventually
supported, was a partial exception to this rule. The subject
is discussed below but the problem was essentially one of pro-
letarian disunity in England and economic advance in Ireland.
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situation. ^ He stated that the Holy Alliance of Russia,
Prussia and Austria was the pox^er base of reaction in Europe
and that the alliance was held together by the partition of
Poland i.e., the common theft of Polish territory made the
three nations interdependent. The support which the Austrian,
Prussian and Polish aristocracy received from the Russians
permitted them to retain their dominance and to keep their
respective bourgeoisie classes subjugated. Engels' solution
was a war with Russia in order to obtain Polish independence,
"The war with Russia would be a complete, pub-
lic and real break with our whole shameful oast,
it would mean the liberation and unification of
Germany, the re-establishment of democracy on
the ruins of feudalism and the brief dream of
ascendency of the bourgeoisie, "ij.
This support for the Poles provides an example of the
first, beneficial type of independence movement as well as
advocacy of a war against reaction. Engels believed that Po-
lish independence would split the alliance of the three re-
actionary regimes and promote proletarian interests as is evi-
dent fro.,i his reference to the temporary ascendency of the
3
^Frederick Engels, "The Debate on Poland in Frankfurt
( 181+8) " in Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, Fds
.
,
The Russian Menace to Furore (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
195^ ) pp. 91-95. Although Fngels is the author, Marx undoubted-
ly agreed with the views since, in Engels' own words, Marx was




1bourgeoisie. This Polish issue also exemplifies the tempo-
rary nature of Marxist support. Engels wrote to Marx and
evaluated the Polish peoples' revolutionary contribution
two years after the NRZ article was published.
"The more I think over the business the clearer
it becomes to me th c t the Poles as a nation
are done for and can only be made use of as an
instrument until Russia herself is swept into
the agrarian revolution. From that moment on-
wards Poland will have absolutely no more rea-
son for existence. "5
Both Marx and Engels continued to support the Polish inde-
pendence movement for the remainder of their lives but, sig-
nificantly, the propitious Russian agrarian revolution, the
conditional basis for their support, did not occur until
after both men had died,
NRZ also took a firm stand in favor of Kossuth's Hunga-
tian Revolution which provides a second example of the Marxist
instrumental use of nationalists and also clarifies the con-
cept of peoples who were "done for" and had ceased to have a
"reason for existence"." Fngels ' analysis places the Austrian
Slavs with the exception of the Poles, the Rumanians and the
Transylvanian Saxons on the side of reaction while the Magyars,
^Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence
,
Letter No. 10, p. 37.
"Frederick Engels, "Hungary and Panslavism (l Qii°)" in
Blackstock and Hoselitz, Eds., pp. 56-67. The articles collected




Germans and Poles were said to represent truly revolutionary
forces. This division was made on the basis of previous histo-
rical record as chronicled in the article. Engels stated that
the three chosen peoples had a history as carriers of pro-
gress, an active role in previous history, and vitality. The
other nationalities are cited as lacking such a record of
progress and were consequently counter-revolutionary and de-
stined to perish. This was not an attribute peculiar to the
Slavs but rather one which could be found in almost any estab-
lished nation.
"There is no country in Europe which does not con-
tain in some corner one or several ruins of people,
left-overs of earlier inhabitants, pushed back by
and made subject to the nation which later became
the carrier of historical development. These re-
mains of nations which have been mercilessly tramp-
led down by the passage of history, as Hegel ex-
pressed it, this ethnic trash always becomes and
remains until its complete extermination or dena-
tionalization, the most fanatic carrier of coun-
ter-revo] ution, since its entire existence is
nothing more than a protest against a great histo-
rical revolution. "7
In addition to their lack of history, the Slavs were also
said to be guilty of counter-revolution because of the Pan-
Slavist movement. Karx and Engels were and remained adamantly
opposed to Pan-Slavism because they predicted that backward,
reactionary, Tzarist Russia would control any type of Slavic





been judged as favorable had it not been for the possibility
of strengthening Russia. The contention that the East Euro-
pean Slavs (Poles excepted) had no future was further bolstered
by the argument thet the vital, progressive Germans and Magyars
who were intermixed with these people would form the bourgeoi-
sie of any nation-state established there. As a result, the
nation would not be Slavic. Indeed, the article says that the
past oppression of the South Slavs belonged among the best
and worthiest deeds of which the German and Magyar peoples
could boast.
°
The Balkan peoples received a great deal of attention
from Marx and Engels and demanded full use of their viable
nationality and war policies. In April of 1853, thej began a
series of articles for the Nex^ York Tribune x-jhich contain the
Marxist assessment of the situation in Turkey and the Balkans,
conditions which were to lead to the Crimean War. In the ar-
ticle of April 7, Turkey was divided into three regions for
o
°Frederick Engels, "Democratic Panslavism (18!l9)" in
Blacks tock and Hoselitz, Eds., p. 76. B.D. Wolfe contends that
Marx and Engels T condemnation of the Slavs is an adaptation of
Hegel who stated thot the Slavs were unworthy to figure in the
grand historical scheme since they had played an insufficient
role in the development of the "Human Spirit", (B.D. Wolfe,
Marxism
,
(New York: The Dial Press, 1965>). However, this argu-
ment is considerably weakened by Marx's support for Polish in-
dependence, the fact that the Serbs were also judged to be "re-
volutionary" on another occassion and En~els T own association
of Pan-Slavism with reactionary Russia. The concent of contri-
butors to the "proletarian revolution" rather than to Hegel's
"Human Spirit" might be a preferable analogy.
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the purpose of analysis. Egypt was removed from the study
since the authors had decided it would belong to England in
any future partition ^nd Asiatic Turkey was not considered
because Mussulman fanaticism and Turkish nationalism were
too strong to invite any attempts at conquest. This left on-
ly the European portion of Turkey to be considered. The
author then stated that the splendid territory to the south
of the Save and Danube had the misfortune to be inhabited by
a conglomerate of different races and nationalities, of which
it was hard to say which was least fit for progress and civi-
lization. The essay states that the Turks themselves had
earned this right until l85>3 by keeping the area under Tur-
kish domination but, after that date, their weakening rule
lost them the prerogative. The fanaticism of Islam had also
periodically availed itself of help from reactionary Austria
or Russia and, for these reasons, Turkey was placed in the
counter-revolutionary category. After an assessment of the
other nationalities in the area itself, all were judged to
be reactionary with the possible exceptions of the Wallachians
Marx or Engels, "The Background of the Dispute" in
Bla.ckstock and Hoselitz, Eds., pp. 121-128. The editors do not
identify the author of articles under this chanter and since
both Marx and Engels submitted essays to the Tribune under Marx's
name, it is difficult to say which author was actually respon-
sible. The authorship source determinations of the Marx-Lenin
Institute are not available since these articles are conspicu-
lously lacking in Soviet published collections of Marx and




and Moldavians under Turkish rule and the Serbs. It should
be noted here that in 1^53 the Serbs had graduated from
their ethnic trash status of 18)4.9. However, a nation could
achieve the Marxist, revolutionary category and earn the
right to temporary existence in far less time than the Serbs
had needed. On April 12, 1853, after providing a lesson to
the English on the value of the Dardanelles for both commer-
cial and military reasons in hopes of promoting their inter-
vention, the Tribune article rehabilitated the Turks who had
been branded as reactionaries only five days earlier.
"But let Russia get possession of Turkey, and her
strength is increased nearly half, and she be-
comes superior to all the rest of Europe put to-
gether. Such an event would be an unspeakable
calamity to the revolutionary cause. The main-
tenance of Turkish independence, or, in case of
a oossible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,
the arrest of the Russian scheme of annexation,
is a matter of the highest moment. In this in-
stance the interests of revolutionary Democracy
and of England go hand in hand. Neither can per-
mit the Czar to make Constantinople one of his
capitals, and we shall find that when driven to
the wall, the one will resist him as determined-
ly as the other. "10
Virtually anything was nreferable to Russian expansion.
The article of April 19, still trying to encourage in-
tervention, assured the western bourgeoisie that the absence




ly effect the volume of trade with the Balkans.
H
On August $, things looked so disappointing to Marx that the
whole of Western Furope was branded reactionary and he was
even willing to tolerate Slavic emancipation or a Greek em-
pire.
"Too impotent and too timid to undertake the re-
construction of the Ottoman Empire by the estab-
lishment of a Greek Empire, or of a Federal Re-
public of Slavonic States, all they [^Western
Governments3 aim a "t is to maintain the status
quo, i.e., the state of putrefaction which for-
bids the Sultan to emancipate himself from the
Czar, and the Slavonians to emancipate them-
selves from the Sultan.
The revolutionary party can only congratulate
itself on this state of things. The humiliation
of the reactionary Western Governments, and
their manifest impotency to guard the interests
of European civilization against Russian en-
croachment, cannot fail to work out a wholesome
indignation in the people who have suffered
themselves, since lQij-9, to be subjected to the
rule of counter-revolution. "13
By February of l85>i|., English and French fleets were in the
Black Sea and the prospects of a general war were sufficient
to warrant some Marxist speculation about its possible ef-





12The Greeks had also been branded as reactionary in ear-
lier articles of the series.
13Karl Marx, "Traditional Russian Policy" in Blackstock
and Hoselitz, Eds., p. I6i|
^"Karl Marx, "Military Stalemate and the Home Front
(185J4.-1855)" in Blackstock' and Hoselitz, Eds., pp. 178-182.
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If a European war \<icre to come, Marx stated that it would
probably be between Russia on the one hand and England,
Prance and Turkey on the other. He went on to say that
Austria would probably side with Russia and predicted that
Prussia would seek the highest reward but finally end up in
the Russian camp.
It would be difficult to imagine how badly Marx and
Engels wanted this i^ar if their revolutionary theory were not
taken into account. The situation couldn't have been better.
If England and Prance would declare war on Russia, Prussia
and Austria, the bastions of reaction would be under attack,
the modern civilized countries would be fighting together,
.
Italy and Hungary might gain independence and German unifi-
cation could conceivably be achieved. Proletarian dissatis-
faction with the progress of such a war might result in the
socialist revolution itself. Even if Turkey kept its dominant
role in Eastern Europe, there would be no significant loss
since the evaluation of the Balkan nationalities had not
shown any great degree of superior historical vitality among
the peoples there.
Unfortunately from the viewpoint of Marx and Engels,
the ideal war steadfastly refused to escalate to the degree




"The fact is, that conservative Europe - the
Eurooe of "order, property, family, reli-
gion" - the Europe of mon^rchs, feudal lords,
moneyed men, however they may be different-
ly assorted in different countries - is once
more exhibiting its extreme inrootency, Europe
may be rotten, but a war should have roused
the sound elements, a war should have brought
forth some latent energies; and assuredly
there should be that much pluck among two
hundred and fifty millions of men, that at
least one decent struggle might be got up
wherein both parties could reap some honor,
such as force and spirit can carry off even
from the field of battle. But no, not only
is the England of the middle classes, the
Prance of the Bonapartes, incapable of a de-
cent, hearty, hard-fought war; but even Rus-
sia, the country of Purope least infected
by infidel and unnerving civilization, can-
not bring about anything of the kind. The
Turks are fit for sudden starts of offen-
sive action, and stubborn resistance on the
defensive, but seem not to be fit for large
combined maneuvers with great armies. Thus
everything is reduced to a degree of im-
puissance and a reciprocal confession of
weakness, which appears to be as recipro-
cally expected by all parties. With Govern-
ments such as they are at present, this
Eastern war may be carried on for thirty
years, and yet come to no conclusion. "15
This type of war monger ing marks the remainder of the Tribune
articles with invectives against governments, war ministers
and generals. The great opportunity was slipping away.
In June of 1855, Sevastopol was finally taken and the
peace of Paris was signed in March of 1356. Although Turkey





Crimea was dealt a severe blow, the war was an almost total
failure when measured against Marxist revolutionary expecta-
tions. There had been no significant revolutionary setbacks
but neither were the advances x^orth mentioning.
The flagrant and opportunistic instrumental use of na-
tional aspirations in order to achieve the Marxist goal of a
socialist revolution is so evident when measured against any
norms other than those of the revolutionary theory itself
that further comment is not necessary. However, it is of. in-
terest to analyze what Marx and Engels were doing in terms of
their own system of values.
According to their theory, the inevitability of both
the revolution and of national conflicts until it occurred
were certain. The Communist Manifesto may be interpreted as
requiring only a waiting neriod with interim, proletarian
coordination activities. However, Marx and Engels had chosen
a policy of actively promoting the revolution. This decision
presumes that the hardships which result from the intentional
exacerbation of conflicts will not outweigh the advantages to
be gained from the early achievement of socialism. There is
no Marxist argument which justifies this assumption. If their
efforts had succeeded, the result would have been a general
war in either I8I4.8 or 18£3. Some assurance that the pain and
loss of life involved would be equal or less than the total
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evil of the economic exploitation which would otherwise have
occurred during the remaining period before the "natural" pro-
gression to socialism is certainly necessary for rational men
to make this decision. Still it is lacking. It might be argued
that war was the inevitable result of the class struggle but
there is no certainty that the particular wars x^hich Marx
chose to promote were either inevitable or necessary.
A similar question arises over support for independence
movements. When selectively supporting them, what assurance is
there that the correct choice of nationality has been made?
Marx and Bagels clearly based their selections on past histo-
rical achievements but, by their own admission, previous histo-
ry had been a series of involuntary, accidental occurrences.
Furthermore, if history is to be the criteria, then the choice
of the Poles and Magyars as nations with a particular aptitude
for generating bourgeoisie exploiters was a poor one. It was
the Czech portion of Austria in which industry developed ear-
liest and the Czechs had been relegated to the "ethnic trash"
category. To have advocated Czech suppression and Hungarian
or Polish dominance in I8I4.8 subsequently appears to be the
equivalent of demanding useless hardship, a strange activity
for humanitarians. A dialectical approach reveals that Marx
was exploiting the Poles and Magyars as surely as any bourgeoi-
sie would have. According to his theory, a successful Polish
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or Hungarian independence effort was impossible before these
peoples reached their full historical development. According
to Marx, it required successive, quantitative advances in the
mode of production followed by a qualitative change to a more
modern economic base in order for the political superstruc-
ture to shift. If the effort to achieve independence were pre-
maturely successful, the new nation was doomed to immediate
failure for want of new economic foundations. The only salva-
tion would be immediate support from industrially advanced,
socialist countries since bourgeois greed precluded any other.
However, neither Marx nor Engels were ready to guarantee that
independence for either nation would result in a socialist
revolution. To encourage a nation to seek independence when
success is impossible according to one's o\m theory is rather
weird benevolence unless some greater good is an absolute
certainty.
An early socialist revolution would also have meant
that national differences would be greater than those which
remain after a period of full economic development. If an
early revolution occurred, then what was to prohibit further
strife and oppression among even socialist nations? Expressed
another way, why should an enemy be attacked today if histo-
ry decrees he will be a friend tomorrow? No Marxist reply to






Regardless of how a humanitarian believed that the bet-
terment of mankind was to be achieved, goading international
conflicts was a poor choice of strategy in the environment of
growing nineteenth century nationalism. The conflicting fo-
reign policy objectives of the established nation-states were
constrained only by a balance of nower structure which was
subject to frequent shifts because of rai)Id industrial and
technological advances. The real and constant threat of war
which resulted from this unstable situation caused an ever
increasing demand for the individual nation to provide pro-
tection from foreign encroachment for its citizens. In order
to provide this security, various national governments sought
to attain an ever stronger power base through territorial ex-
pansion, a method which only served to reinforce the interna-
tional conflict of interest. In this ominous atmosphere, con-
ducive to both nationalism and war, it was not likely that
Marx and Engels would achieve the unification of the prole-
tariat. In Marxist terms, their analysis of the historical
schedule was incorrect. The pitiful condition of the working
classes, so carefully documented by Marx in Canital , had not
yet resulted in the removal of proletarian, national loyal-
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ties even among the industrially advanced countries. However,
it took a catastrophic series of events to convince Marx of
this fact and force him to reinterpret the status of the class
conflict.
There had been several warnings that the application
of the theory was not entirely compatible with historical re-
ality. V/hen the Second Reoublic was established in France,
Marx had written that the revolution itself was a combined
effort of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and that once
the overthrow of the old government was achieved, the French
bourgeoisie had suppressed their proletarian allies. He hailed
that event as the first great battle fought between the two
classes of modern society.
"Thus only the -June defeat has created all the
conditions under which France can seize the
initiative of the Furopean revolution. Only
after baptism in the blood of the June insur-
gents did the tricolor become the flag of the
European revolution - the red flag. "1
As the vanguard of Marx's revolution, the French fumbled
badly and they did so only three years later when Louis Na-
poleon's coup d'etat ended the Second Republic in December of
185>1. Engels at first declared this to be a silly, stupid co-
•^Karl Marx, The Class Struggle in France
,
in Lewis S.
Feuer, Ed., Br sic Writings on Poli t ics and Philosophy by Ksrl




medy ivhich would not last. 2 Later, as the regime proved to
be more than a transitory phenomenon, he made the remarkable
assertation that Louis Napoleon's continued success was due
to a completely bourgeois attitude on the part of the French
workers, a result of the imperial prospects, 3 if this evalua-
tion were accepted, the revolution was at a much less advanced
stage than that which was depicted in the optimistic Communist
Manifesto
.
Marx did not agree. His own analysis is contained
in The Eighteenth Brums ire of Louis Bonapart e which was writ-
ten in 1852.^" He attributed the absence of a true revolutiona-
ry spirit in France to the arrest of the leaders of the pro-
letariat and to proletarian fear of a recurrence of bourgeois
oppression. He stated that the supremacy of Louis Napoleon
was simply the dominance of the executive over the parliamen-
tary branch of government. He even discovered an advantage in
that the isolation of the executive left it vulnerable to a
future, concentrated, proletarian attack. This explanation
salvaged the theory of the inevitable progression of history
and solved the problem of French, imperialistic, proletarian
2 -Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence
18J+6-1S95
,
Letter No. 17, p. 51.
%bid.
,
Letter No. 19, p. 60.









Although Marx was able to put Fngels ' mind at ease
over the difficulties in France, he became increasingly aware
that there was a great lack of proletarian internationalism.
In 186I]-, x^hile writing the charter for the first "international",
he was forced to address the subject of relations between the
various nations. Rather than state his nationality policy for
what it actually was, he resorted to general and ambiguous
phrases. He admitted that this was intentional and justified
himself to Engels in a letter on i| November, I86I4.:
"in so far as international politics come into
the address, I speak of countries, not of na-
tionalities, and denounce Russia, not the lesser
nations. My proposals were all accepted by the
sub-committee. Only I was obliged to insert two
phrases about "duty" and "right" into the Pre-
amble to the Statutes, ditto "truth, morality,
and justice," but these are placed in such a
way that they can do no harm. "5
The obvious assumption was that the workers would not have
accepted the theory/ with all its implications for the nationa-
lities.
The Irish presented Marx with another problem of prole-
tarian nationalism. In November of 1867, he wrote to Engels
that although he had previously thought that Irish independence
was impossible, he now believed that it was inevitable."
-^Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence
,
Letter No. 71, p. 162.
6 Ibid, . Letter No. 101, p. 228.

«The fact that nationalism was the cause for this shift and
Marx's admission of it are evident. A letter to Kugelmann
of 29 November, 1869, stated that the repression in Ireland
had caused a great many Irish immigrants to seek work in
England and, as a consequence, the struggles for Irish inde-
pendence were then reflected in disunity among the English
and Irish ivorkers within England itself. ' This analysis of
the problem was repeated in a letter to Meyer and Vogt on the
9th of April, 1870:
"But the English bourgeoisie has much more im-
portant interests in the present Irish regime.
Owing to the constantly increasing concentra-
tion of farming, Ireland supplies its own sur-
plus to the English labour market and thus
forces down wages and lowers the moral and
material position of the English working class.
And most important of all: every industrial
and commercial centre in England now possesses
a working-class population divided into two
hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish
proletarians. The ordinary English worker
hates the Irish worker as a competitor who
lowers his standard of life. In relation to
the Irish worker he feels himself a member
of the ruling nation and so turns himself in-
to a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists
against Ireland, thus strengthening their do-
mination over himself, "8
England, the most industrially advanced of the Euronean coun-
tries, suffered from a divided working class. Proletarian dis-
7 Ibid.
,
Letter No. 1^, pp. 278-279
8Ibid., Letter No. llj.1, p. 289
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unity there precluded any possibility of a successful Eng-
lish revolution which, in turn, meant that the entire Euro-
pean revolutionary movement was weakened. In order to remove
the cause of the conflict, Marx advocated Irish independence.
The small, Irish nation had obtained a concession from Marx
which was unique. Their country was neither large enough nor
rich enough in natural resources to merit a separate national
existence according to his views. They were economically
backward, had already been "centralized" by the British bour-
geoisie, and should have been well on the road to denationali-
zation. Marx smoothed over the apparent anomaly with a pre-
diction that once the Irish were free, they would enter into
a federal agreement with England, thus preserving his ideas
on economic unity.
^ In order for a nation to enjoy a place in the Marxist
plan until the revolution occurred, it had to be of a certain,
optimum size. Generally, a country required a quantity of oo-
pulation, territory and resources which would permit it to
achieve an advanced state of economic development (S.F. Bloom,
World of Nations
, Chp. 1±) , A country which was able to meet
these criteria merited independence and the right to freely
determine its own destiny. Lesser nations did not. Engels had
stated this idea in his articles on Polish independence. To
say that the Poles merited independence and self-determination
did not mean that the lesser nationalities which had been in-
cluded in the Polish state before the partition of 1772 also
obtained this right. (Engels, "What Have the V/orking Classes to
Do with Poland?" in Blackstock and Hoselitz, eds., Chp. 6). In
1882, Engels. said that the Irish and Poles had not only the
right but the duty to be nationalists and that, when they were,
they became internationalists of the best kind (Engels, "Na-
tionalism, Internationa] ism and the Polish Question" in Black-
stock and Hoselitz, eds., Chp.9).
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The issue of Irish and English proletarian disunity was
soon replaced by historical events of much greater signifi-
cance. By July of 1870, Bismarck had finally managed to goad
Louis Napoleon into war and by August, Marx was elated at its
progress. He was certain that this war would lead to a new
governmrnt in France. To insure a united effort, Engels pro-
posed the following policy for Marxist adherents:
!, I think our people can:
1. Join the national movement - you can see from
Kugelmann's letter how strong it is - in so
far as and for so long as it is limited to
the defense of Germany (which does not exclude
an offensive, in certain circumstances, be-
fore peace is arrived at)
.
2. At the same time emphasise the difference bet-
ween German-national and dynastic-Prussian in-
terests.
3. Work against any annexation of Alsace and Lor-
raine - Bismarck is now revealing the inten-
tion of annexing them to Bavaria and Baden,
i|. As soon as a non-chauvinistic republican go-
vernment is at the helm in Paris, work for an
honourable peace with it.
5. Constantly stress the unity of interest bet-
ween the German and French workers, who did
not approve of the war and are also not making
war on each other,
6. Russia, as in the International Address. "10
The policy was easier to establish than to execute. Nationalism
l^Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence
,
Letter No. ll|5, pp. 296-297
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was running rampant in France and Germany. Marx himself at-
tested to the strenght of German feelings on August 17, 1870:
"The lust for Alsace and Lorraine seems to pre-
dominate in two circles, the Prussian camarilla
and the South German beer-patriots. It would be
the greatest misfortune which could befall Europe
and above all Germany. "11
By the 12th of September, Engels was fearful that the French
workers might revolt before peace was concluded and wrote to
Marx that this should be prevented if at all possible.
"I would be appalling if as their last act of
war the German armies had to fight out a battle
with the Parisian workers at the barricades. It
would throw us back fifty years and delay every-
thing so much that everybody and everything
would get into a false position - and the na-
tional hatred and the domination by phrases
which would then arise among the French wor-
kers.' 1^
On January 28, 1871, the French provisional government, which
had replaced the badly beaten Louis Napoleon, signed an ar-
mistice with the Prussians. The threat of a confrontation
between French workers and the German army had been avoided
but a new disaster soon befell the proletariat of France,
The Prussian peace terms which were accepted on March 1st
provided for the annexation of the whole of Alsace and a







Letter No. 11+9, p. 305 - see also Engels' ar-
ticle in Pall Mall of 17 September, 1870.
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toward the unfavorable terms which the provisional govern-
ment had signed together with the monarchist leanings of
that government led to another revolt in Paris. The rebels
siezed power and formed the "Commune" along socialist lines
but it was a very temporary revolutionary success. On May 21st,
French government forces attacked the workers. In seven bloody
days of fighting, 20,000 were killed in the streets of Paris
and the Commune was obliterated.
The Franco-Prussian War, the Annexation of Alsace, and
the fall of the Commune caused both an awakening and a serious
dilemma for Marx and Engels. It was a many faceted problem.
1. After the war, Central and Western Europe were
divided into approximately the economic regions
which Marx considered adequate for further, ra-
pid, industrial progress. Germany was now firm-
ly united and the undisputed leader of the Ger-
man speaking people. Italy had united in 1866.
Nevertheless, there were still territorial de-
lineations which caused severe proletarian dis-
unity, especially the German-French enmity over
Alsace and the English-Irish problems. There
were also irredentist murmurs on the Italian
Peninsula. How these territorial revisions
could be achieved without a general war wss not
at all clear. With German unification and Louis
Napoleon's fall, the number of beneficial war
possibilities was markedly reduced.
2, Warfare among the Western European countries
was no longer an acceptable method of oromoting
• the revolution. The German slaughter of the
French forces had aptly shown the potential
destructiveness of modern warfare. Furthermore,
the war had been one of national mobilization
on the part of Germany and conscription had
placed the workers themselves in the fighting.
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3. The premature establishment of the Paris Commune,
generated by nati -na lis tic resentment and the
wholehearted support of the war effort by the
German workers had irrefutably disclosed the low
level of proletarian awareness which existed.
1+, It was evident that modern industrial growth,
the sine qua non of a proletarian revolution and
socialism, was accompanied by increasingly de-
structive military capability which, in turn,
posed a serious threat to the very industry
which created it.
5. Worst of all, the Marxist theory itself pre-
dicted that the possibility for a war among the
industrially advanced nations was likely, A mo-
dern mode of production increased bourgeois com-
petition in the world market as the number of
products increased. The badly divided proleta-
riat had little chance of a successful coup be-
fore a new war broke out unless there was a
marked and rapid increase of awareness.
After 1871, there was an evident reduction in the attempts on
the part of Marx and Engels to either encourage independence
movements or war monger. Both men became more concerned with
the internal politics of the nations and with the promotion
of proletarian interests through parliamentary methods or
trade union activities. The class conflict in Russia, vir-
tually ignored before 1871, received some attention. National
factionalism in the "international" led Marx to abandon it in
1872. He explained this in a letter to Bolte in November of
that year and concluded:
"Where the working class is not yet far enough
advanced in its organisation to undertake a de-
cisive campaign against the collective power,
i.e., the political power of the ruling classes,
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it must at any rate be trained for this by con-
tinual agitation against and a hostile attitude
towards the policy of the ruling classes. Other-
wise it will remain a plaything in their hands,
as the September revolution in Prance showed,
and as is also proved up to a certain point by
the game Messrs. Gladstone & Co. are bringing
off in England even up to the present time. "13
Sorge resigned from the "international" in 1871+ and Engels
agreed with his action. He predicted that Marx's writings
would have an influence in the years to come and then a new
Communist International could be founded. I4 The difference
between these and the statements of 181+8, the Crimean War
period, or even as late as the Austro-Prussian war of 1866
is unmistakable. The situation was not serious enough to
cause either Marx or Engels to question the entire theory
of economic determination but nationalism was striking some
telling blows.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 seemed to provide the
answer to Marx's theoretical dilemma. Such a war xvas complete-
ly acceptable. Russia and Turkey were both reactionary and a
war between the two might result in a Russian revolution,
Marx believed that such a revolution was imminent since all
sections of Russian society were in complete disintegration
economically, morally and intellectually. ^5 There seemed to
^Ibid.
,
Letter No. 1^7, p. 319
^Ibid.
,
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be no threat of war between the West European countries and
Marx predicted that the Prussian aristocracy might even fall
if they intervened. A bourgeois revolution in Russia or the
fall of Prussia could trigger the proletarian revolution in
Europe and the problem of national antagonisms would be re-
solved.
"For the moment everything depends on the Poles
(in the Kingdom of Poland) lying low. If only
there are no risings there at the moment. Bis-
marck would at once intervene and Russian chau-
vinism would once more side with the Tsar. If
on the other hand the Poles wait quietly till
there is a conflagration in Petersburg and Mos-
cow, and Bismarck then intervenes as a saviour,
Prussia will find its - Mexico. "16
In Germany, Liebknecht prepared a pamphlet calling for inter-
vention on the side of Turkey in order to protect the Western
Powers from Russia. Marx sent him two letters supporting the
article but, by the time it appeared, the war was over and
the revolutionary hopes were dashed.
When the subject of a new "International" arose in l8Sl,
Marx opposed its formation, stating that it would fail to take
national differences into consideration.
"it is my conviction that the critical juncture
for a new International Workingmen ' s Association
has not yet arrived and for this reason I regard
all workers » congresses, particularly socialist
congresses, in so far as they are not related
l 6xoIbid.
,
Letter No. 165, P. 3U-9 • A Polish independence
movement was not deemed opportune for the revolution.
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to the immediate given conditions in this or
that particular nation, as not merely useless
but harmful. They will always fade away in in-
numerable stale generalised banalities. "17
Marx died in 1883 still opposed to an "international"
and without providing a solution to the problem of nationalism
in Western Europe. Engels' writings from 1883 until his own
death in 18 Q 5> expressed antipathy for x^ar among the advanced
countries and tended, more and more, to support the promotion
of proletarian ascendency either through use of the means
provided by representative government or subversion. In 1888,
he wrote to Sorge that a war would set the workers movement
back for years and chauvinism would swamp everything.
When the rapproachment between France and Russia
threatened war in Europe, Engels wrote to Bebel that the par-
ty would almost certainly come to power in Germany in another
ten years and then allow Alsace and Northern Schlesx^ig to de-
termine their own fate.
"For all that, I hope oeace remains unbroken.
In our present -position we do not need to risk
everything - but war would force us to do so.
And then in another ten years we shall be quite
differently prepared ......Therefore, I hope
and desire that our splendid and secure develop-
ment, which is advancing with the calm and in-
evitability of a process of nature, may remain
• on its natural lines. "18
17 IbicU, Letter No. 173, P. 387
l8Ibid., Letter No. 219, P. 1+92
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Engels' clearest expression of his anti-war policy is con-
tained in a preface to a new edition of the Class Struggles
in France which aoneared in 1895. The article also practically
precluded the future revolt at the barricades as involving too
great a risk. The threat of war was eliminated by simply
stating that war was no longer possible,
"The recruitment of the whole of the population
able to bear arms into armies that could be
counted in millions, and the introduction of
firearms, orojec tiles and explosives of hither-
to undreamt of efficacy created a complete re-
volution in all warfare. This, on the one hand,
put a sudden end to the bonapartist war period
and insured peaceful industrial development,
since any war other than a world war of unheard
of cruelty and absolute incalculable outcome
had become an impossibility. On the other hand,
it caused military expenditure to rise in geo-
metrical progression, and thereby forced up
taxes to exhorbitant levels and so drove the
poorer classes of people into the arms of so-
cialism. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine,
the most immediate cause of the mad competi-
tion in armaments, might set the French and
German Bourgeoisie chauvinistically at each
other's throats; for the workers of the two
countries it became a new bond of unity. And
the anniver^ay of the Paris Commune became the
first universal comm rmoration day of the whole
proletariat. "19
This weak assurance of man's rationality and the statement
that the taxation necessary for an arms race would drive oeople
to socialism is as close as Marx or Engels ever came to oro-
•^Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France, I8k3-l8£0
(New York: International Publishers) p. TT. The Marxist shift





&viding a solution to nationalism in the advanced countries.
Both men died still convinced that nationalism was a bourgeois
trait and that the proletariat only needed to be convinced of
the fact. They had been able to use nationalism as an instru-
ment of apparent benefit to the revolutionary cause in their
early writings and had set an example for their followers by
doing so, Hoxtf nationalism was to be combated when it became
a counter-revolutionary force,as had been the case in 1871,




Vladimir I. Ulyanov was initially far more concerned
with internal class conflicts in Russia than with the exter-
nal manifestations of those struggles. ^ Marx and Engels had
sought a war against Russia to generate a bourgeois revolu-
tion there and thus sar> the strength of European reaction.
Lenin was absorbed in party organization, agitation, propa-
ganda and activism in order to promote the revolution from
within. Thus it was 1905 before he made his first oronounce-
ments on the subject of international warfare.
When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, it proved to be
an elementary exercise for as knowledgeable a Marxist as Le-
nin. Since Japan was fighting against Russia, Japan was pro-
gressive. Lenin proclaimed this idea when Port Arthur fell to
Japan on January 2, 1905. Advancing, progressive Asia had
_ 2dealt backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable blow.
Although not chronologically separable, for our-ooses of
analysis it is convenient to place Lenin's doctrines on the sub-
ject of nationalism into three categories: (a.^ The "croblem of
wartime nationalism; (b) The optimum choice of federation, auto-
nomy or unity for the party organization and (c) The type of
organization suitable for a multi-national, socialist state
system. Such a division is employed in this essay. Section V
deals with national wars and VI with the topics of party and
state organization.
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1963) Vol. 3, p. b.8
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In spite of this baleful beginning, Lenin was not and never
would be the war monger that Mary or Engels had been in their
early years. He was quick to prevent any mi sunder standing on
the part of the proletariat. The same article declared:
"The revolutionary proletariat must carry on a
ceaseless agitation against war, always keeping
in mind, however, that wsrs are inevitable as
long as class rule exists. "3
This statement must have seemed a bit too pacifistic since it
restricted the Marxist view that some international warfare
could be beneficial to the proletariat. This was rectified in
another essay on the war which was published in July.
"There are wars and wars. There are adventurist
wars, fought to further dynastic interests, to
satisfy the appetite of a band of freelooters,
or to attain the objects of the knights of ca-
pitalist profit. And there is another kind of
war - the only war that is legitimate in capi-
talist society - war against the people's op-
pressors and enslavers. "I4.
Lenin's next opportunity to promote proletarian inter-
ests through support of war was provided by the Balkan states.
His commentaries are significant in that they demonstrate how
his views differed from those of Marx and Engels, his relative
naivete concerning national aspirations and his ideas on inde-
pendence movements. Marx and Engels had usually welcomed war
3 Ibid.
, p. 53
fr-Ibid. 9 p. 565 * July 10, 1905
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in the Balkans but Lenin was not so ready to commit himself
to support of a Balkan war nor was he willing to speculate
on the probable allignment of nations as his predecessors
had done. His first remarks on the Balkan situation appeared
in Pravda on October h, 1°12 and were critical of an article
in Novoye Vremya
,
which had referred to Balkan unrest as a
rallying together of the lesser nations for a holy war of in-
dependence. Lenin accused the paper of supporting bourgeois,
Russian, nationalist plunderers who did not recognize the
possibilities of a war involving all of Europe.
"The nationalists' calculation is frank and
shameless to the last degree. While mouthing
pompous words about "a holy w^r of indepen-
dence" of the peoples, they gamble with the
lives of millions in the most cold-blooded
way by inciting the peoples to a carnage for
the profit of a handful of merchants and in-
dustrialists. "5
Lenin did not want a war. The issues were too confused and
the risk seemed prohibitive.
When the first Balkan war began on October 8, 1912,
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro were allied against
Turkey. Lenin's attitude changed immediately. This was clear-
ly a war of oppressed peoples against reactionary Turkey and
he favored it so long as there was no intervention by the
Western European nations.
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. 339

59
"Even the most "liberal" bourgeois Europe, we
say in rerly, can bring the Balkans nothing
but suprort for decay and stagnation, nothing
but bureaucratic obstacles to freedom. It is
"Europe" that is hindering the establishment
of a federal republic in the Balkans. "6
The war appeared to be going so well that Lenin referred to
it as a "New Chapter in World History" on October 21st. He
stated that a step had been taken towards doing away with
the survivals of medievalism throughout Eastern Europe. ' The
Balkan monarchies had also solved the national problem to
Lenin's satisfaction.
"The class-conscious workers of the Balkan
countries are the first to put forward the
slogan of a consistently democratic solu-
tion of the national problem in the Balkans.
That slogan calls for a Balkan federal re-
public. The weakness of the democratic clas-
ses in the nresent-day Balkan states (where
the proletariat is small in number and the
peasants are downtrodden, disunited and il-
literate) has resulted in an economically
and politically indispensable alliance be-
coming an alliance of Balkan monarchies. ,! 8
On March 29, 1913, Lenin stated thst the Balkan war was coming
to an end. He believed that the capture of Adrianople was a
conclusive victory for the Bulgarians and that the problem's
centre of gravity had shifted from the theater of operations






9Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 19
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These were Lenin's last words on the Balkan situation and he
would certainly have revoked them had it been possible. Hosti-
lities had barely ceased when formerly progressive Greece, Ser-
bia, Montenegro and Rumania, the national problem solvers,
joined reactionary Turkey and attacked Bulgaria. The fighting
began in June and ended in August of 1913. Lenin remained si-
lent. Indeed, his former statements had been so wide of the
mark that there was little to say. He chose to ignore the is-
sue and was able to do this so effectively that he almost
missed the beginnings of the first world war.
World War I was as hard a lesson for the leader of the
Bolsheviks as the Franco-Prussian one had been for Marx. The
"Second International" shattered as once again Social-Demo-
crats rallied to the national standards. Lenin was confronted
with the problem which Mary and Engels had left unsolved. His
first reaction was a polemic against the socialist traitors
to the revolution who were hastily voting war credits. They
were bourgeois, chauvinist liars. The war itself was clearly
defined as a bourgeois, imperialist and dynastic war. ^ j-^
was the duty of the Bolsheviks to agitate against the Tsar
and chauvinism and the need was for weapons against one's
own government, not against fellow workers of other nations.
10Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. l£
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Lenin's concept of converting the international war
into a series of civil conflicts, although far easier said
than done, was at least a partial theoretical solution. How-
ever, two difficulties remained. First of all, the most defi-
nitive Marxist statement on the then current situation had
been Fngels' contention that defense of the fatherland was
permissable under such circumstances. "Defense of the father-
land" was a hopeless solution. Both French and German Socialists
were using that motto to .-justify their lack of international
fervor while a state of war quite clearly existed between the
two. Nevertheless, this was the Marxist heritage and if Lenin
departed from it, he vjould need some very sound reasons. The
second obstacle, closely related to the first, was the matter
of national oppression. If one of two opposing countries con-
tinued to be aggressive while another's war effort broke down
into civil war, the nation engaged in civil conflict would
surely be invaded and oppressed by the aggressor, Lenin's so-
lution so far lacked sufficient motive force to bring the pro-
letarians and socialists to allow themselves to be oppressed
by foreigners.
By November of 191I+, Lenin had a rough solution. This
was an Imperialist war x^hich resulted from an advanced stage
of capitalism and workers who supported it were being deluded.
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"The question of the fatherland - we shall reply
to the opportunists - cannot be posed without
due consideration of the concrete historical na-
ture of the present war. This is a imperialist
war, i.e., it is being waged at a time of the
highest development of capitalism, a time of
its approaching end To the nresent-day
bourgeoisie's attempts to divide and disunite
them by means of hypocritical appeals for the
"defense of the fatherland" the class-conscious
workers will reply with ever new and persevering
efforts to unite the workers of various nations
in the struggle to overthrow the rule of the
bourgeoisie of all nations. The bourgeoisie is
duping the masses by disguising imperialist ra-
pine with the old ideology of a "national war".
This deceit is being shown up by the proleta-
riat, which has brought forward its slogan of
turning the imperialist war into a civil war. "11
Lenin had his theoretical solution. In the problem solving
process, he had linked together the earlier theories of pos-
sible proletarian nationalism resulting from either national
oppression or fraud on the part of the bourgeoisie and the
idea of supra-national capital. The first of these theories
had been developed during the intra-party debates over the
nationality question itself and was, at the time, quite re-
cently derived.-^ The idea of supra-national capital and bour-
geoisie had been employed as early as 1895 in dealing with the
i:LIbid., pp. 38-39
12Stalin's essay Marxism and the National Question , first
published in 1913, offered the idea that, especially under con-
ditions of oppression, the nroletariat and peasantry might be-
come nationalistic and that the strength of any such movement
depended upon the degree to which they participated in it.
(J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,
1953), Vol. 2, pp. 319-320).
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"Economists" who had emphasized the inevitability of the re-
volution and "trade unionism".
"Commercial ties between the different countries
are becoming closer and more extensive; capital
constantly passes from one country to another.
The banks, those huge depositories that gather
capital together and distribute it on loan to
capitalists, begin as national institutions and
then become international, gather capital from
all countries, and distribute it among the ca-
pitalists of Europe and America Interna-
tional associations of capitalists make their
appearance. Capitalist domination is interna-
tional. "13
In 1895, this theory had served to explain the tardy arrival
of Marx's revolution and had justified the need for violent
revolt. Now Lenin was also applying it to the problem of the
national war raging in Europe, In theory, there should have
been no further problem with nationalistic conflicts. The
bourgeoisie struggle was on a supra-national level and they
employed their nation- state system only as an instrument to
further their hopes of world domination. For a proletarian
or peasant to allow himself to be duped into assisting them
in this struggle under national pretenses was clearly inane.
Both Marx and Engels received some very cavalier treat-
ment at this point. Lenin simply threw their theory away as
being antique.
"In short, it is not surprising that Marx and the
Marxists confined themselves to determining which
1
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 2, p. 109
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bourgeoisies victory would be more harmless to
(or more favourable to) the world proletariat,
at a time when one could not speak of a general
proletarian movement against the governments
and the bourgeoisie of all the belligerent coun-
tries. "ll|
Lenin had become so engrossed in eradicating nationalism that
he made the same omission that had occurred in 1905>. Progressive
wars of national liberation had been forgotten again. This time
he used the Serbs as an example in correcting the error and
managed to force at least some of his earlier Balkan pronounce-
ments into the new theoretical mold. He had said they were pro-
gressive nationalists in 1912 and maintained that they still
were.
"in the present war the national element is re-
presented only by Serbia's war against Austria
(which, by the way, was noted in the resolution
of our Party's Berne Conference). It is only in
Serbia and among the Serbs that we can find a
national-liberation movement of long standing,
embracing millions, "the masses of the oeoples",
a movement of which the ^resent war of Serbia
against Austria is a "continuation". If this
war were an isolated one, i.e., if it were not
connected with the general P-'urooean war, with
the selfish and predatory aims of Britain, Rus-
sia, etc., it would have been the duty of all
socialists to desire the success of the Serbian
. bourgeoisie - this is the only correct and ab-
solutel;/ inevitable conclusion to be drawn from
the national element in the present war."l5>
Lenin went on to say that this element exemplified one per-
^Lenin^ Collected Works , Vol. 21, p. 186
^Ibid., p. 235 •
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cent of the war effort. The remaining ninety-nine percent
was imperialist.
By the fall of 19 l£, Lenin had rounded out the theory
and issued it under the title "Socialism and War". When the
debate over the matter of the interpretation of imperialism
continued, he summarized his arguments in a x^ork under that
title in 1916. 16
When the novel theory of capitalist imperialism first
appeared, it created a great fury of condemnation by other
Marxists. ' The most frequent and obvious objection was that
imperialism had clearly existed before and during Marx's life-
time but Marx himself had never associated it with the econo-
mics of modern industrial societies. He had condemned Germa-
ny's annexation of Alsace as nationalistic imperial ism of the




feudal Russia. ( Lenin's new theory amounted
to an argument that Marx had been in error. His contention
that there had been no proletariat during the nineteenth cen-
tury implied the refutation of much of the Marxist doctrine
which had clearly referred to an existent working class.
l6Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, pp. 186-30I+
'B.D. Wolfe has described the war of words end Lenin's





l8Karl Marx, "'I'he Background of the Dispute (l8£3-l85l|.)
"
in Blackstock and Hoselitz, Eds., pp. liiO-lLt-l.
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There were other purely theoretical objections, Marxist
doctrine had amply provided for the possibility of general
war in Europe. The greater competition in the world market
which resulted from increased productivity was sufficient
cause. There was no apparent need for Lenin's new theory
other than to prevent proletarian participation in the war
and the Western European Social-Democrats thought that par-
ticipation was necessary. Each national party could rationa-
lize that they were the vanguard of Marx's revolution, staunch-
ly defending against reaction. A non-Marxist argument from a
Russian whose theory also inferred absolution of his own
country from any blame for the war was unacceptable.
Lenin's new doctrine also had some deletorious strate-
gic implications. Extra-national, bourgeois agreements at
least partially excluded the divisive character of the capi-
talist camp, an advantage which "pure" Marxism retained, °
There had been little objection to the concept of interna-
tional capital in 189£. Lenin was practically unknown among
Social-Democrats then and the argument that violent revolu-
tion was necessary in Tzarist Russia did not seem either ir-
rational or dangerous. Applied to conditions in 191i|, the
-^This was Kaut sky's objection. Lenin's reply was that
bourgeois contradictions remained and these antagonisms re-
sulted in the periodic "redivision" of the world (Lenin,
Collected Works, Vol. 22, pp. 289-293).
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doctrine extended the requirement for violent revolution out-
side Russia itself. Western Social-Democrats might agree that
this was necessary for backward Russia which still required a
bourgeois revolution but not for modern nations such as their
own. Too much progress had been made through representative
government to risk it all and certainly not for a non-Marxist
idea.
The fact that Lenin's theory failed to convince other
Marxists was a serious challenge to its validity. However,
when considered in terms of other value systems, further ob-
jections also arise. One of Lenin's central premises was that
Germany's extreme imperialism was due to a relative lack of •
colonies to receive excess capital. ° This caused a need for
expansion. He also cited the United States as having a cor-
responding need and stated that industrial growth was even
more rapid there. If this had been the case, there should
have been a much more immediate need for U.S. expansion since
Lenin's own table of colonial possessions indicates that the
































By application of Lenin's theory, the United States should
have been at war before Germany. If colonial possessions of
2.9 million square kilometers couldn't absorb Germany's ca-
pital, 0.3 million was not likely to suffice for the U.S.
Lenin's selection of corporations which had reached
agreement on the division of the world was also most unfor-
tunate. In order to prove the international character of ca-
pital, he cited the following alliances or conflicts which
22had occurred during that division.
Alliances
1. An agreement between Union Electric (A. E.G.) of
Germany and General Electric of the United States.
2. German and Anglo-American mercantile shipping
agreement,
3. Distribution of oil in America and Germany by
the American oil trust.
Conflict
1, Rockefeller versus the Anglo-Dutch oil trust.
If these agreements or enmities existed, then the U.S. and
Germany should have been close collaborators. The possibility
of war between the two, even if there was a "redivision" is
excluded by Lenin's theory. There was absolutely no reason
for the "colony poor" U.S. to attack "colony poor" Germany.




land and. Russia. * Even if allowance is made for the fact
that the U.S. was not in the war, the argument lacks validi-
ty. The U.S. could remain out of the war and be assured th°t
new colonial possessions would become available as war
weakened European colonial control and Europe itself became
"capital poor".
For Lenin's theory, the worst possible choice of action
for the U.S. was to declare wsr on Germany. In April of 1917,
that declaration was made. Woodrow Wilson, with the committee
for the promotion of U.S. bourgeois interests firmly sup-nort-
ing him, refuted V.I. Lenin.
Imperialism was too good a propaganda vehicle to be
abandoned just because it was untrue. The contention that na-
tions who were poor in capital could not be guilty of aggres-
sion had an even better application once Lenin's Bolsheviks
seized power. A socialist state, which had abolished capital,
could not be imperialistic by definition. Furthermore, non-
national capitalistic avarice provided reasons for virtually
any course of action chosen by the communists. The socialist
state itself did not have to be threatened by another nation
.
Subversive capitalists would provide a perpetual threat so
-'What Russia, an importer of capital, was doing with
colonial possessions is not explained.
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severe that protective measures would always be necessary
whether war or peace existed. The communists could pose as
the defenders of their own peoples as well as every other
non- industrial nation in the world. Any activity on the part
of economically advanced, capitalistic nations had to be
based on exploitation and greed. Only communists could "li-




Party and State Organization
Lenin's earliest difficulties with nationalism con-
cerned questions of party and state organization which arose
prior to the second congress of the Russian Social-Democra-
tic Party in 1903. Two Austrian socialists, Karl Renner and
Otto Bauer, had devised a novel solution to the nroblem of
national minority differences and rights for their multi-na-
tional state. 1 Since Austria was a country with the various
ethnic groups intermixed throughout its territories, they
believed that two methods of administration were necessary.
One organization, formed along territorial lines, was to be
responsible for local administration. This group was also to
provide for inter-territorial coordination at the federal go-
vernment level and would constitute the usual state system.
At the same time, a second body, consisting of representatives
from ethnic groups who were not to be limited by territorial
boundaries, was to be formed. They were to represent all of
their nationality in matters of language, culture and educa-
tion regardless of location and under the urotection of state
law. Those who lacked a distinct territory were also to be
Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitaetenfrage und Die Sozial-
demokratie (Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhendlung, IP 21].)
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represented. This formula of extra-territorial, national-
cultural autonomy was immediately accepted by the Bund, an
international organization of Jewish Social-Democrats, since
their people had no state or province which they could call
their own.
As articles on national-cultural autonomy began to ap-
pear, Lenin was forced to turn his attention to the national
question. Bauer's formula was unacceptable to him for several
reasons,
1. It appeared to be a threat to the highly uni-
fied, democratic -centrist party which he be-
lieved was necessary for successful coordina-
tion of revolutionary work.
2. There was no need for autonomy or federation
in a truly socialist state. National differen-
ces were to cause no problems since they would
cease to exist.
3. The formula was not Marxist in that it removed
a part of the social superstructure from the
economic (territorial) base.
Lenin had expressed his ideas on using national aspira-
tions to further the revolutionary cause in 18^5 and h?d also
decided on the relationship of the party with bourgeois na-
tionalists and various other groups. In Russia, the party of
the proletariat could form a temporary alliance with nationa-
lists, educated classes, the petty bourgeoisie and religious
Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 2, p. 333
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groups who were subject to persecution at the hands of the
Tzarist government. This alliance would have to be of a
temporary nature however. Only the proletariat would be ca-
pable of single-minded perseverance in generating a fully de-
mocratic revolution. The others, who were plagued with deep-
rooted class antagonisms, could not be fully trusted because
they might be willing to make concessions or compromises be-
fore the dictatorship of the proletariat was achieved,-5 This
demonstration of Lenin's understanding of the Marxist instru-
mental use of nationalists was not a particularly auspicious
beginning but at least it did show some greater degree of
leniency than the blanket condemnations which were characteris^
tic of Marx and Engels.
In February of 1903, as the influences of the Bauer for-
mula began to take effect, Lenin made his first pronounce-
ments on state organization in an article on the Manifesto
of the Armenian Social-Democrats .^- He praised the Armenians
for including two correct principles on the nationality ques-
tion in their declaration. These were:
1. The demand for political and civil liberties




, Vol. 6, pp. 328-330.
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2. The right of self-determination for every na-
tionality which formed a part of the state.
Lenin then went on to t^int out that there was an inconsisten-
cy in the Armenians' program. He stated that the demand for a
federated republic was not compatible with equality and self-
determination, and declared that the party had no business
preaching federalism. Federation was said to presuppose auto-
nomous class states which would lead to divisive influences
among the proletarians. After calling for unity, Lenin went
on to explain his concept of self-determination.
"The demand for recognition of every nationali-
ty's right to self-df termination sirmoly imolies
that we, the party of the proletariat, must al-
ways and unconditionally oppose any attempt to
influence national self-determination from with-
out by violence or injustice. While at all times
performing this negative duty of ours (to fight
and protest against violence) , we on our -oart
concern ourselves with the self-determination of
the proletariat in each nationality rather than
with self-determination of r>eoples or nations." 1?
He added that supnort for autonomy might be necessary in ex-
ceptional or isolated cases but that it should never be con-
sidered a permanent or binding part of the uarty's program.
This early article is of great importance in understanding
Lenin's position on the question of nationalism. The state-




decisions and that autonomy or federation were unacceptable
as anything other than an interim measure to be infrequently
applied were policies which he adhered to until after the re-
volution."
At the second party congress in 1903, the Bund attempted
to have the Bauer formula accepted and demanded that they be
recognized as the sole representative of the Jewish proleta-
riat in Russia. They also advocated organization of the So-
cial-Democratic party on an autonomous basis and the use of
extra-territorial, national-cultural autonomy for future so-
cialist states. Lenin polemically opposed these efforts and
was able to muster enough support to defeat the resolution.
The Bundist representatives walked out and their departure
gave him the majority in the Congress which permitted him to
push through his centrist party plan and most of his nationa-
lity policy. The national question was treated in articles 3,
7,8 and 9 of the oarty -program x^hich emerged.
"Article 3 .: Regional self-government for those
border areas in which the way of life
and composition of the population
differ from those in genuinely Rus-
sian areas.
Article 7.: Destruction of social orders (Soslovii)
"Lenin's concept of an opportune application of federa-
lism is contained in his analysis of the Balkan situation in
1912. Federation was the "correct" solution for the Balkan
Monarchies who lacked a oroletariat (Lenin, Col] ected Works
,
Vol. 18, p. 368).
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and full equality for all citizens,
regardless of sex, religion, race and
nationality.
Article 6. : The right of a people to receive edu-
cation in its native tongue, which
right is to be guaranteed by the estab-
lishment of schools necessary for that
purpose at the expense of the govern-
ment and the organs of self-government;
the right of every citizen to use his
native tongue in public meetings; the
use of native language on a basis of
equality with the state language in all
local, public and government agencies.
Article 9. : The right of all nations ( Tlatsii) in
: the state to self-determination. ''7
Lenin objected to the word regional in article three as un-
o
duly restrictive but lost on this particular issue.
The national qurstion submerged from the scene for a
time but by 1912, the Bund, Polish Social-Democrats, Menshe-
viks and the Balkan independence movements forced it to the
surface again. Lenin came out strongly for both party and
state unity, declaring that the two questions were linked to-
gether.
"Federation for the "nationalities", with separate
centres and without a separate centre for the
Russians, or complete unity? The Party has
moved away from it for good. Where has it moved
to? Towards an "Austrian" federation? Or towards
a complete renunciation of federation, to actual
?Samad Shaneem, The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of
National Self-Determination (The Hague, Bandung: W, Van He




unity? We are for the latter. We are opposed to
"adapting socialism to nationalism" . "9
Lenin had included the demand for party unity as early as
the 1903 congress and he never wavered on this point, ac-
cepting splits in the Social-Democrats rather than compro-
mise, The requirement for a similar organization in a socia-
list state, hinted at in the "Armenian" article, was now
clearly announced, Lenin also adhered to this "all or nothing"
principle until later events forced him to concede.
The national question remained a hotly contested issue
among Marxists and the necessity for a more complete explana-
tion, along with a refutation of Bauer, "became imperative,
Lenin, involved in squabbles which had mostly arisen out of
his absolute decree on party unity, lacked the time to write
the required article. As a result, he chose one of his lieu-
tenants, J.V, Stalin, for the task. Stalin was a Georgian
from one of the "non-sovereign" border regions and his selec-
tion would eliminate any taint of Great-Russian chauvinism
from the pamphlet. Lenin sent him to Austria, accompanied by
Bukharin, to formulate the complete "Marxist" doctrine on the
subject of nationalities,
Stalin produced Marxism and the National Question .
Trotsky, in referring to Stalin's efforts, called it, "his
9Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 18, p. lj.12
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only important or rather his only theoretical work" and at-
tributed the thoughts and many of the actual phrases to T,enin
instead of Stalin. When one considers the quality of other
Stalinist works which never again aporoached the subtleties
of this article, it appears that Trotsky was correct. Lenin's
earlier writings had, in fact, included most of the princip-
les which Stalin set forth. In questioning whether Stalin
alone was capable of i^riting the essay, Trotsky also pointed
out that the bril 1 iant Marxist theoretician, Bukharin, was
the only member of the two-man Austrian task force who knew
German, the language in which Bauer had written.-^
"Stalin's" article begins by establishing the bond bet-
ween nationalities and the concept of an economic base and
10Leon Trotsky, Stalin, An Apnraisal of the Man and his
influence (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers,
191x1) PP. 158-159.
H-For comparison, Lenin's early works on the national
question are contained in the following articles of his Col -
lected Works
;
On Manifesto of Armenian Social-Democrats
,
Vol. 6, pp. 327-329
The National Question in our programme
,
Vol. 6, pp. li 55-1x6 3
The Latest viord in Bunriist Nationalism, Vol. 6, pp. 519-521
Even earlier, he had advocated conditional sunoort for nationa-
lists in The Task of the Russian Social-Democrats
,
Vol. 2,
pp. 333-336. An additional important work is Lenin's A New
Chapter in World History
,
Vol. 18, pp. 368-369, in which he
advocates federation for the Balkans. This also appeared before





cultural superstructure. This was done by enumerating the
characteristics which a nationality should have in order to
be recognized as a nation, -> There were four such require-
ments:
1. Commonly possessed terr:
base
2. Common economic bond ""I
3. Common language
superstructure
l±. Common culture }
A nationality x^hich was lacking in any of these respects did
not qualify as a "Marxist" nation. The nations and the pheno-
menon of nationalism were then firmly tied to history. Na-
tionalism was a historical category of a certain epoch; spe-
cifically, the period of the progression from feudalism to
capitalism. Stalin also resolved the problems of determining
the strength of a nationalist movement and of nationalism
within the ranks of the proletariat. He stated that nationa-
lism's strength depended uoon the degree to which the prole-
tariat and peasantry participated in the movement. This, in
turn was directly related to the type and amount of oppression
to which a nation was subjected and determined the extent to
which these two groups became nationalistic. Since nationalism
arose out of subjugation, the party and proletariat as a whole
^J.V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub-
lishing House, 1953) Vol. 2, op. 303-312,
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were opposed to oppression. It had harmful effects on the
full development of the workers of an oppressed nation. . Sta-
lin clarified this point. Oppression was harmful in two re-
spects. First of all, it limited the general and political
education of the proletariat.
"Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchise-
ment, repression of language, closing of schools,
and other forms of persecution affect the workers
no less, if not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such
a state of affairs can only serve to retard the
free development of the intellectual forces of
the proletariat of subject nations. "Ik
Secondly, preoccupation with national independence movements
tended to unite the x-rorkers with the bourgeoisie rather than
with the proletariat of other nations.
"it diverts the attention of large strata from
social questions, questions of the class struggle,
to national questions, questions "common" to the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates
a favourable soil for lying propaganda about "har-
mony of interests", for glossing over the class
interests of the proletariat and for the intellec-
tual enslavement of the workers. This created a
serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the wor-
kers of all nationalities, "l5
It was for these reasons that Social-Democrats proclaimed the
right of nations to self-determination. J.V. Stalin himself








"The right of self-determination means that only
the nation itself has the right to determine its
destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to
interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy
its schools and other institutions, to violate
its habits and customs, to repress its language,
or curtail its rights."l6
A nation could do whatever it wished.
"The right of self-determination means that a
nation may arrange its life in the way it
wishes. It has the right to arrange its life
on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to
enter into federal relations with other na-
tions. It has the right to comolete secession.
Nations are sovereign, and all nations have
equal rights. "17
At face value, these statements aopear liberal enough to be
accepted by many nationalists. However, Stalin's article had
already excluded the Jews and Nomads of Russia. Neither were
nations if a strict interpretation of the idea of peoples with
distinct territories is apolied. Presumably this lack con-
demned them to extinction just as Engels had passed judgement
on the ethnic trash categories.
It is orecisely this type of ambiguity which robs Sta-
lin's article and, to a lesser extent, Lenin's writings of
any value as a guarantee of national self-determination. A
close inspection of other oassages in Stalin's work reveals
that whether a reader is a knowledgeable Marxist or not, the




article does not provide clear guidance as to the proper
course of action for a Bolshevik or anyone else.
The following oassage appears immediately after the one
which spoke of self-determination:
"A nation has the right to arrange its life on
autonomous lines. It even has the right to se-
cede. But this does not mean that it should do
so under all circumstances, that autonomy, or
separation, will everywhere and always be ad-
vantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majori-
ty, i.e., for the toiling strata. "l8
The reference to "toiling masses" throws open the same ques-
tions which Engels » did when he advocated war in defense of
the proletariat. ' Whether Stalin intended the text as an
advisory to Bolsheviks of other nationalities or was placing
conditions on the right to secede is unclear. Whether invasion
for the good of proletarians in other countries is authorized
or not is a major unanswered question. The confusion increases
when a time factor is added.
"All these are problems the solution of which
will depend on the concrete historical con-
ditions in which the given nation finds it-
self.
More than that; conditions, like everything
else, change, and a decision which is correct
at one oarticular time may prove to be en-
tirely unsuitable at another. "20
l8 Ibid., p. 323
"see page 25 above
20Stalin, Works , Vol. 2, p. 321+
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The question of whether this remark is to be interpreted as
prior to or after the revolution in a country immediately
arises. If Russia "reorganized", the status of the border
nations would certainly be in doubt because of changed histo-
rical conditions,
A Bolshevik who had read Marx extensively would find
further more subtle passages which virtually preclude seces-
sion. Stalin spoke of freedom of self-determination
.
Marx
taught that any man born after the division of labor had oc-
curred, unless he belonged to the ruling class, was born a
slave. This slavery was the result of that very division of
labor which had made man dependent upon others for his means
of livelihood. Only through communism, the negation of the
division of labor, could all men become free. Until such time,
phrases such as right, freedom, etc. were ideas used by the
ruling class in order to deceive those whom they exploited.
"Only in community (with others) has each indi-
vidual the means of cultivating his gift in
all directions; only in the community, there-
fore, is personal freedom possible. In the pre-
vious substitutes for the community, in the
State, etc., personal freedom has existed on-
ly for the individuals of this, the ruling
class. "21
In this meaning of the word freedom, the Bolshevik regime,




in theory, would build the first free state in history by
establishing common ownership of the means of production.
Any attempts to freely choose secession from this wonderful
organization would have to be made by a ruling class of ex-
ploiters. If the workers participated in such a secessionist
movement they did so only because they had been deluded by
bourgeois concepts of a freedom which did not eTist in a non-
communist state.
Stalin had also stated that the party would not support
every demand of a nation. A nation had the right even to re-
turn to the old order of things if they so desired but So-
cial-Democracy would not subscribe to such a decision if taken
by some institution of a particular nation. 22 This apparently
inane remark is of particular importance since it actually
specifies who will make the decision for federation, union
or secession. Again, it is a matter of the Marxist use of
the word institution,
"Since the State is the form in which the indi-
viduals of a ruling class assert their common
interests, and in which the whole civil socie-
• ty of an eiooch is epitomised, it follows that
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This Marxist interpretation of the word institution, when
applied to Stalin's statement, would mean that there was no
institution in a non-socia 1 ist nation which could make a
demand for secession which would be considered legitimate by
the Bolsheviks. Lenin's insistence on democratic centrism in
the party even excluded a demand for independence by other
Bolsheviks.
Some of Lenin's statements further complicate the issue.
Immediately after Stalin's work was published he made the fol-
lowing pronouncement.
"The right of nations to self-determination (i.e.,
the constitutional guarantee of an absolute free
and democratic method of deciding the question of
secession) must under no circumstances be con-
fused with the expediency of a given nation's se-
cession. The Socia l -Democratic" Party must decide
the latter question exclusively on its merits in
each particular case in conformity with the in-
terests of social development as a whole and with
the interests of the -proletarian class struggle
for socialism. "2I4.
Although his constant warnings against the use of force tend
to indicate that Lenin was sneaking of whether or not his
party would lend its verbal sun-port to independence movements,
the statement may be viewed as a demand for active inter-
ference in behalf of the proletariat.
It is little wonder that Stalin's article won him re-
2kLenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. Lj.29.. My italics.
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cognition as a nationalities expert. Every Bolshevik in the
party could read the article, apply his own ideas in inter-
preting it, and come away convinced that he and Stalin were
in full agreement.
When Lenin returned to Russia in 1917, he emphasized
national self-determination in his struggles with the pro-
visional government which had replaced the Tzar. The slogan
was very effective since the assembly was both internally
split over that very issue and externally vacillating in its
dealings with the nationalities. The campaign began with the
April Theses.
"As regards the national question, the proleta-
rian Party first of all must advocate the pro-
clamation and immediate realisation of complete
freedom of secession from Russia for all the
nations and peoples who were oppressed by tsarism,
or who were forcibly joined to, or forcibly kept
within the boundaries of, the state, i.e., an-
nexed The proletarian party strives to create
as large a state as possible, for this is to the
advantage of the working peoole; it strives to
draw nations closer together, and bring about
their further fusion; but it desires to achieve
this aim not by violence, but exclusively through
a free fraternal union of the working oeople of
• all nations. The more democratic the Russian re-
public, and the more successfully it organises it-
self into a Republic of Soviets of workers' and
Peasants' Deputies, the more powerful will be the
force of voluntary attraction to such a republic
on the part of the working people of all nations. "25
2^
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 2k., p. 73
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This emphasis on the voluntary nature of the Russian Soviet
Republic and its attraction to other nations was not just
so many words. Lenin believed it was essential.^ In May of
the same year, during his disputes with Rosa Luxemburg, he
explained this further.
"We stand for the settlement of problems which
the bourgeois revolution has left unsolved. Our
attitude to the separatist movement is indif-
ferent, neutral. If Finland, Poland or Ukraine
secede from Russia, thrre is nothing bad in
that. What is wrong with it? Anyone who says
that is a chauvinist We are for a frater-
nal union of all nations. If there is a Ukrai-
nian republic and a Russian republic, there
will be closer contact and greater trust bet-
ween the two. If the Ukrainians see that we
have a soviet republic, they will not secede,
but if we have a Milyukov republic, they will... "27
Stalin also believed that force would not be necessary. At
the seventh (April) conference of the R. S.D.L.P. (B) he
stated that mistrust was bound to diminish since Tzarist op-
pression no longer existed. He thought nine-tenths of the na-
tionalities would not choose to secede. 28 Both men pursued
26 In his article entitled The Discussion on S elf-Deter -
mination Summed Uo Lenin stated that if a socialist party de-
clares that it is' against the forcible retention of an op-
pressed nation within the frontiers of an annexing state it
is thereby committed to renounce retention by force when it
comes to -power. (Lenin. Collected -Jorks , Vol. 22,p.329). The
exemplary' attraction of the new socialist state was to be ca-
pable of'ncrsuading unity. This was one of Engels « arguments
(see pages 2Ll-25> above).
27
Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 2!l, pp. 300-301. Also
Lenin, "Revision of the Party Program", Col] ec ted W^rks , Vol. 26, p.
1
28Stalin, Works , Vol. 3, P. 5&
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the "all or nothing" policy up to the time of the coup in
29October. When the take-over occurred, the ambiguity and
impracticality of the doctrine for a party of the Bolshevik
type were to become painfully evident. Before discussing
that failure, it is of interest to note that Lenin made one
further contribution to the confusion just prior to October.
In his battle to convince the party that the time for action
had come, he wrote and published Can the Bolsheviks Retain
State Power . -^ The article advocated the use of terror to
achieve revolutionary ends. If he meant to exclude petty
bourgeois nationalists or deluded proletarians, he forgot
them.
2
°Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 2£ - State and Revolution ,
pp . [|li9 -i|50 ; Vol. 26 - Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power ,
pp. 115-118. Stalin, dorks , Vol. 3 - Against Federalism, po7 2^-33.





Lenin made a definite effort at apolying his non-co-
ercive theory when the Bolsheviks seized power. He announced
the desire for immediate neace ^nd included a decree against
violence or annexations at the Second, All Russia Congress
of Soviets on October 2£, 1919 (old calendar).
"If any nation whatsoever is forcibly retained
within the borders of a given state, if, in
spite of its expressed desire - no matter
whether expressed in the "nress, at public meet-
ings, in the decisions of parties, or in pro-
test and uprisings against national oppression -
it is not accorded the right to decide the forms
of its state existence by a free vote, taken af-
ter the complete evacuation of the troops of the
incorporating or, generally, of the stronger na-
tion and without the least pressure being brought
to bear, such incorporation is annexation, i.e.,
seizure and violence. "1
At the same meeting, the first provision for a state organi-
zation in the form of commissariats was made and there was
no mention of either unity or federation. On November 25,
he promised Finnish and Ukrainian independence if this was
what they demanded and, in fact, recognized Finland. 3 The
Ukrainians were another matter and presented the first real
^Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 26, p. 250
2 Ibid., pp. 262-263





challenge to Lenin's national theory. It was found thorough-
ly lacking.
The beginning of the revolution at first appeared
oxuite favorable in the Ukraine,^" In Kiev, the Rada and the
Bolsheviks formed an uneasy and distrustful alliance in the
overthrow of the forces of the Provisional Government. Once
that government was defeated and there was no longer a need
for such cooperation, troubles arose. On December k, 1917,
the Bolsheviks called an all Ukrainian Congress of Workers',
Soldiers' and Peasants' Soviets in an effort to gain control.
They were immediately confronted with two problems. First of
all, less than 100 of the 2,^00 delegates were Bolsheviks
and secondly, an ultimatum from Lenin's Council of Peoples'
Commissars in St. Petersburg arrived on the same day. The
ultimatum, written by Lenin himself, provides an excellent
summary of the oroblems which had resulted from his seizure
of power. ^ It also marked the beginnings of "War Communism"
for the national groups of the former Empire. Lenin began by
stating his recognition of Ukrainian independence and national
rights. After praising himself for his similar recognition of
^-The chronology of events in the Ukraine is t*ken from
Richard Pipes, Tho Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 196k) Clip. III.
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, np. 361-363.
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Finnish rights, he got down to the business at hand.
"We accuse the Rada of conducting, behind a
screen of national phrases, a double-dealing
bourgeois policy, which has long been ex-
pressed in the Rada's non-recognition of the
Soviets and of Soviet power in the Ukraine
(incidentally, the Rada has refused to con-
voke a territorial congress of the Ukrainian
Soviets immediately, as the Soviets of the
Ukraine had demanded) , This ambiguous policy,
which has made it imoossible for us to re-
cognise the Rada as a plenipotentiary repre-
sentative of the working and exploited masses
of the Ukrainian Reoublic, has lately led the
Rada to steps which nreclude all possibility
of agreement. "6
The specific problems which Lenin accused the Rada of causing
included their demands th^-t Ukrainian troops return home
from the front, disarmament of soviet troops, and the grant-
ing of freedom to White forces to cross the Ukraine. Then
the ultimatum itself was presented.
"At the r>resent time, in vieitf of the circum-
stances set forth above, the council of Peoples'
Commissars, with the full cognisance of the
peonies of the Ukrainian and Russian Republics,
asks the Rada to answer the following questions:
1. Will the Rada undertake to give up its at-
tempts to disorganise the common front?
2. Will the Rada undertake to refuse transit
to any army units on their way to the Don,
the Urals or elsewhere, unless it has the
sanction of the Commander-in-Chief?
3. Will the Rada undertake to assist the re-
volutionary troops in their struggle against
the counter-revolutionary Cadet-Kaledin re-
volt?
"Ibid., pp. 36l-.^62. The territorial congress of Soviets
which Lenin demanded was in session when his message arrived.
He had no way of knowing this and, consequently, the incredibly
poor timing of the ultimatum resulted.
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k. Will the Rada undertake to stop attempts to
disarm the Soviet regiments and the workers'
Red Guard in the Ukraine and immediately re-
turn arms to those who had been deprived of
them?
In the event no satisfactory answer is received
to these questions within Ii8 hours, the Council
of People's Commissars will deem the Rada to be
in a state of ooen war with Soviet
-cower in Rus-
sia and the Ukraine. "7
The Ukrainian Congress rejected the ultimatum as an infringe-
ment on their independence. The situation went from bad to
worse. On December 19, 1918, Lenin tried to negotiate with
the Ukrainians again but they refused to meet his terms.
8
Indeed, with the confusion which reigned throughout the for-
mer empire, it was impossible even if they had wanted to co-
operate. The Ukrainians could no more distinguish army de-
serters from Whites or brigands than Lenin could. His demands
were completely unreasonable.
Lenin was saddled with a theory much like Engels ' "de-
fense of the fatherland". It had sounded fine until actual
application x^as required. Then matters appeared considerably
different. The theory had been satisfactory in choosing one
or another independence movement for propaganda purposes. It
had worked well in the struggle with the provisional govern-






able and could be used to decide matters. The need to con-
solidate the newly won position of power, White opposition
and the demands of the war with the Central Powers ensnared
Lenin. There was no way to separate the bourgeois and Whites
from the nationalist workers and peasants. Independence move-
ments had become as inimical for Lenin's Russia as they had
been for Marx's Western Europe.
There were other compile a tions, A great many of Lenin's
followers were Great Russians. As these Great-Russian Bol-
sheviks attempted to secure their position in Russia itself
and in the borderlands, chauvinism alienated many more of the
minorities. Quite understandably, this form of oppression
from St. Petersburg could not be distinguished from the pre-
vious Tzarist brand. This attitude removed the last hope of
success for Lenin's theory.
Lenin officially abandoned his previous doctrine of
state unity and non-coercion in January of 1918 at the Third,
All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Either he applied force or
the Bolshevik regime wou"1 d have collapsed. From Lenin's point
of view, this would have meant the loss of any hone for the
oppressed proletariat for a long time to come. If oppression
of the nationalists was necessary to remain in power, so be
it. Such movements were bourgeois by definition and if some
of the proletariat were participating in the national move-

9k
ments, the;/- would have to be sacrificed for the good of all.
A federal constitution was decreed and, although Lenin's
speech on the occassion is full of phrases about unity and
a world-wide state, he was clearly compromising in order to
retain some of the vaunted, exemplary, unifying influence.
9
In 1931, Stalin attested to the real nature of the concession
in an author's note on his article, Against Federalism
,
which
he had written prior to the revolution. 10 He gave three rea-
sons for the corrroromise.
1. A number of the Nationalities of Russia had
separated and federation might result in
closer relations,
2. Federation proved not so contradictory to
economic ties as had been expected.
3. The national movements had Droved to be
stronger and much more complex than ex-
pected.
When Lenin adooted the federal system, it was to be
only a temporary measure. His control of the government was
so tenuous even in Russia itself that attaching a federal
label to the independent nations of the former Tzarist Em-
pire was quite optimistic. Recalling that Marx had said
that the revolution would soon follow in Western Furope,
which would solve Lenin's multitude of problems including
9Ibid.
, pp. [i79-[l q 2
10Stalin, Works, Vol. 3, PP. 25-33
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organizational matters, federation should have lasted for
only a matter of months at the most. In the meantime, a
holding action was necessary and a declaration of federa-
tion might conceivably help.
Economic, martial and national oroblems steadily x^or-
sened for Lenin. German evacuation of the Ukraine orovided
a second opportunity to apply his national policy. When
Germany surrendered to the Allies in November of 1918, anar-
chy reigned in the Ukraine. Farlier, in the fall of that year,
the heads of the former Rada had formed the Ukrainian National
Union with an executive organ, the Directorate, headed by
Vinnichenko. This group managed to overthrow the forces of
the Hetmanate, which had ruled during the occuoation, and
established a government in Kiev on the liith of December, 1919,
While these Ukrainian nationalists were attempting to conso-
lidate their position to insure an independent state, Bolshe-
viks were already invading. Lenin had not even bothered to go
through the motions this time, A "Soviet" Government of the
Ukraine had been founded at Kursk with Piatakov at its head.
This farcical regime was entering the Ukraine on the heels
of the Red Army. When the Directory received news of Soviet
^The chronology of events used is taken from Richard
Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Chp. III.
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troop movement in the north and northwest, they protested
to Moscow. Chicherin replied that the troops were not Mos-
cow's but Piatakov's, that the Ukraine was experiencing a
civil war, and that the Russian Socialist Republic had no
aggressive intentions against the independence of the Ukraine. 12
The blatancy of these statements is evidenced by Lenin's
telegraphic directive to Serpukhov, Commander-in-Chief of
the Red invasion force. It was sent on the 29th of November,
1918, before Chicherin 's reply.
"As our troops push on westwards and into the
Ukraine, provisional regional Soviet govern-
ments are being formed to back up the Soviets
in the localities. This, has the advantage of
depriving the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian
and Estonian chauvinists of a chance to re-
gard our troop movements as occupation and of
creating a favourable situation for further
advance. Otherwise our troops would have been
in an impossible situation on cccunied terri-
tory and the local population would not have
met them as liberators "13
l^The Ukrainians seem to have achieved tx>ro "firsts" of
questionable value. The Soviet use of normal diplomacy while
conducting actual subversion of a government, the two-camp
formula, was applied there for the first time as was the em-
ployment of a puppet regime to iustify an invasion.
The Baltic states received similar treatment. See S.W. Fage,
"Lenin, the National Question and the Baltic States, 1917-1°"
in The American Slavic and ?ast European Reviex-f
,
Vol. VII,
No. 1, IQI4.9, pp. 1.5-n
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. 22£
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On February 6, 191 Q , the Red Army re-entered Kiev. The So-
viet Government assumed control but lasted only seven months
when Donekin's Whites drove them out a second time. The third
and final Soviet government followed the Red Army into the
Ukraine again in December of l q 19 and established the regime
which was to last until World War II,
The Ukraine was not a special case of failure for Le-
nin's national doctrines. The predominantly Great-Russian
Bolsheviks also alienated allies who attempted to coooer.ate
with his new regime. The Bashkir peoples' experience demon-
strates the worst example of this type of tragedy. ^
When the Provisional Government came to power, the
Bashkirs demanded territorial autonomy. This demand was denied
and the Bashkir leadership took steps toward founding a na-
tional government. When the Bolshevik coup occurred, the So-
viet which was established at Ufa consisted primarily of the
Great-Russian nationals who resided in the area and it was
hostile to the local Bashkir population. The Bashkirs reci-oro-
cated. Their leaders moved to Orenburg and announced the for-
mation of an Autonomous Bashkir Republic which Lenin promptly
recognized. This act was, in fact, a oromise at the time since
•^•This chronology of events is taken from Richard F. Pines:
"The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir
Republic (1917-1920)", in Russian Review Vol. IX, No.li (Octo-
ber, 1950) pp. 303-319.
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the area itself was held by the White General, Dutov. In
February of 1918, the Red Army defeated Dutov, entered Oren-
burg and arrested the Bashkir leader, Validov, along with the
Bashkir Council. The Red forces then proceeded to set-up a
Bolshevik Temporary Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkirs. Soon
after this Soviet was established, Moscow decided to form a
Tatar-Bashkir republic. The local Bolshevik Bashkir Soviet
opposed unification with the Tatars but Moscow refused to
recognize their demand and ordered the territories united.
The issue, was temporarily settled when the Whites captured
the contested area again.
The short interim period had sufficed to demonstrate
that neither the Bashkir nationalists themselves nor the lo-
cal Bolshevik Soviet could gain a significant degree of auto-
nomy. As a result, when the White army regained the region,
Validov was released from prison, a Bashkir military force was
formed and it fought with Kolchak. Kolchak's unitarian poli-
cies and lack of tact soon caused Bashkir enmity and, in Feb-
ruary of 1919, the Bashkir leadership decided that they would
change sides and fight for the Bolsheviks if Moscow would
insure their independence. This offer was made and accepted.
A telegram, signed by both Lenin and Stalin, was addressed to
the Bolsheviks at Ufa and it stated the terms of the offer to-




"Propose not to alienate Khalikov and to grant
amnesty on condition that a common front with
Bashkir regiments is set up against Kolchak.
The Soviet government uledges its full guaran-
tee for Bashkir notional freedom. But natural-
ly, you must deal severely with counter-revo-
lutionaries among the Bashkir population and
achieve de facto control to ensure proleta-
rian reliability of Bashkir forces . "15
The Bashkirs, assured of independence, joined the Red Army,
By the fall of 1919, Red forces again held the Ural area end
the Bashkirs attempted to establish their authority. They en-
countered immediate opposition from the local Russians. On
May 19, 1920, the Soviet government issued a new decree on
Bashkir autonomy which was completely centrist. The Bashrev-
kom objected and when Moscow refused concessions, civil war
erupted in Bashkirya. The suppression of the Bashkirs was
only a matter of time for the superior Red forces. In late
1920, a new Bashkir Republic was formed with no Bashkirs at
all in the government. Moscow, in the face of a firm committ-
ment to grant them their independence in order to gain the
support of the excellent Bashkir military had made a complete
about face. Lenin's policy would not work even for the peoples
who befriended his government.
Stalin is often accused of a great deal of the oppres-
1
^Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 28, p. Ijli^
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sive actions which occurred during the period of dissolution
but the charge is not too valid. From 1917 until 1920, Stalin
did not have a position of authority which permitted him to
cause the antagonisms which arose. The commissariat of nationa-
lities began as an advisory organization and the chairmanship
itself was vacant from the Summer of 1918 until the Spring of
1920. Stalin was at the front. V/hen he did resume the chair-
manship, his heavy-handed efforts at consolidation and uni-
fication caused much unnecessary hardship but, until 1920,
Lenin was primarily to blame. Lacking ethnic -prejudice him-
self, he expected others to deal with the various peoples on
a similar basis. He held the state authority which he had
wrenched out of the hands of the provisional government. He
was responsible for the confused policy proclamations. Under
the pressure of events, he was the first to officially sanction
the infraction of the rule against violence. Once set in mo-
tion, he also lacked sufficient power to stop the abuse of
national rights.




Two Men - Two Policies
Once Lenin accepted "both coercion and federation,
his national doctrine became completely unintelligible.
While demanding party unity for the Bolsheviks, he was al-
so advocating a federal form of government for states in
which that single political party was obtaining power. The
two were completely incompatible and, when the massive in-
flux of relatively unsophisticated party members which be-
gan in September of 1917 is considered, demanding adherence
to both doctrines placed ever increasing stresses on the
party itself. One of the best examples of the confusion was
revealed at the Eigth Party Congress in 1919. In a dispute
with Pyatakov, on March 19, he was barely willing to admit
that there was any national movement at all in the Ukraine
or that the Ukrainian language was the language of the people
there. In the same sneech, after stating that there was too
much emphasis on self-determination, he spoke of the success
which had been achieved through recognition of Finland and
emphasized voluntary alliances. While this sort of nonsense
demonstrates the type of declarations which the membership
Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 2Q , p. 19l±. Pyatakov was




had to attempt to unravel, it also demonstrated Lenin's own
uncertainty. Pyatakov was being attacked for a suspected
breach of party unity and the short lived Finnish Soviet
example was cited as the ideal of state federation. Lenin's
doctrine amounted to unity when he had control and compro-
mise when he did not. The fact that the Ukrainian Bolshe-
viks failed to understand this was ominous. In 1919, Lenin
began to consolidate for a longer struggle. He instituted
the Comintern in an effort to achieve the all inclusive so-
lution to his problems, the Western European Revolution, and
at the same time began to take a more realistic vieitf of mat-
ters in Russia. By December, he recognized the existence
of genuine Ukrainian nationalism and even gave a strong argu-
ment for its existence in his article Flections and the Dic -
tatorship of the Proletar iat. 3 He finally realized that his
efforts to split the peasantry had failed, gave up the clas-
sifications of rich, middle and poor, lumped all peasants
into the petty bourgeoisie category, stated that they vacil-
lated between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, emphasized
the need for an alliance with them and cited the Ukraine as
an example.^- By the end of 1919, he went on record that there
Olga Hess Gankin, "The Bolsheviks and the Founding of
the Third International" in The Slavic and Fast European Re -
view
,
Vol. XX, 1914-1. pp. 88-101.




were differences between Great Russian and Ukrainian Com-
munists and that those differences concerned the state in-
dependence of the Ukraine and the national question. ^ He
added that concessions would have to be made to the Ukrai-
nians. In the desperate days of late 1919, Lenin was be-
ginning to put some meaning into federation. The concessions
were not great but they must have appeared monumental to his
unitarian mind.
In February of 1920, Cheka use of the death penalty
was abolished and terror began to subside. At the Ninth Par-
ty Congress in March of 1920, he announced the end of "War
Communism" and the transition to oeaceful economic develop-
ment.
The war with Poland caused a return to many of the
old policies but also proved the necessity of reform. Eco-
nomic conditions in Russia proper, the Ukraine and the bor-
derlands had been poor during the x^inter of l°l c>-1920. The
Polish war was the last straw. Russia almost starved in the
winter of 1920-21 and nearly froze to death while doing it.
During that winter, Lenin drafted the N.E.P. program
which amounted to a compromise with both the peasants and




peoples. 6 At the Tenth Party Congress he declared that to
continue "War Communism" meant failure of the revolution
and emphasized the need for influence instead of terror.
He stated that, until there was a revolution in other coun-
tries, only an alliance with the oeasantry could save the
socialist revolution in Russia and that building socialism
in such a manner would take decades. In July, he pronounced
Federalism a satisfactory transitional form of government.
"Federation is a transitional form to the com-
plete unity of the working people of different
nations. The feasibility of federation has al-
ready been demonstrated in practice both by
the relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and other
Soviet Republics (The Hungarian, Finnish and
Latvian in the past, and the Azerbaijan and
Ukrainian at present), and by the relations
within the R.S.F.S.R. in respect to nationali-
ties which formerly enjoyed neither state-
hood nor autonomy (e.g., the Bashkir^and Ta-
tar autonomous republics in the R.S.J?.b.K # ,
founded in 1919 and 1920 respectively). 8
Ideologically, full acceptance of a federal state system
was very sound. The N.F.P. meant the rise of capitalism
in
the new Soviet system. According to Marx, rising
capitalism
was accompanied by a growth of nationalism. If
economic en-
cessions were to be made to the petty-bourgeoisie
peasants




8Lenin, Collected Works , Vol. 31, PP. l^-lii7
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and they were to become allies, nrovision had to be made
for their increased national aspirations. At the same time,
N.E.P. was a ticking bomb from the Marxist viewpoint. If
capitalism were allowed to increase, Kulaks would obtain
power. The divisive force of nationalism would be strength-
ened.^ In both instances, the Communist Party stood an ex-
cellent chance of collapsing. Lenin had started a race
against the clock. Rr-alizing the risk, he instituted the de-
cree on party unity along with the N.E.P. to ensure strength
and solidarity. 10 A year later, at the Eleventh Congress,
the anti-factional decree was passed to further reinforce
the party apparatus.
Lenin and Stalin had already begun a drive for state
unity through the organization of the Russian Soviet Fe-
derated Socialist Republic. When Stalin returned to the
chairmanship of the Commissariat of Nationalities (Narkom-
nants) in 1920, he immediately began to work toward increas-
ing its scope and authority. His first move was to obtain
delegates from the territories and establish a Soviet of
nationalities. The necessary decree was obtained from the
'Stalin spoke of its danger during the conviction of
Sultan Galiev for "national deviation" in 1923. (Stalin,
Marxism and the Nationa l and Colonial Question , New York:
International Publishers" xT. lYo")
~
10Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 2k8
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state apparatus on May 19, 1920. 11 A year later, Stalin
obtained authorization to send delegates to the territo-
ries, including treaty and federated republics, for purpo-
ses of "supervising" fulfillment of decrees by the Central
Federal Authority of the R.S.F.S.R. 12 Lenin knew of this
maneuver and approved of it for his signature appears on
the document. This decree amounted to a complete shift in
the character of Narkomnants in that it changed from an
advisory organization to administrative functions and the
republics were lashed together through the Nationalities
organization as well as the party. It is interesting to
note that the list of representatives for the Soviet of Na-
tionalities included the "head of the Jewish, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Polish, Finnish and Estonian departments for
Nationalities. ""^ This had the appearance of being very de-
mocratic and, at the same time, representatives were ready
in case of an opportunity to establish a new revolutionary
government. It may or may not have occurred to Stalin or
Lenin that they had also made a de facto application of the
much maligned "Bauer" formula by accepting representatives of
11Rudolf Schlesinger, Ed., The Nationalities Problem
and Soviet Administrat ion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul









Stalin's authority became even greater on July 27,
1922 through another All-Russian state decree. 1^ The di-
rective assigned Narkomnants the following duties:
1. Draft all projects and measures relating to
national policy.
2. Take necessary measures for aoplication of
common federal legislation and ordinances.
3. Give opinions on all financial and material
matters
,
l\.. Participate in drafting of an all-federal
system of taxation,
5>. Supervise common work of the autonomous re-
publics and regions,
6. Defend national rights,
7. Establish representatives on the central
executive committees and Soviets of Peoole T s
Commissars in individual Republics and auto-
nomous regions.
8. Negotiate with representatives of the nationa-
lities
.
9. Collect material on modus vivendi of the na-
tionalities ( Census )
.
10. Train corps of oolitical and soviet workers
of non-Russian nationality.
J. V. Stalin's Commissariat had virtually become the govern-
ment of the R.S.P.S.R, for everything except military affairs
•Walter Russell Bstsell, Soviet Rule in Russia (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1929) pn. 151|-1Q 1.
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and negotiations with non-socialist countries. This situa-
tion would have been dangerous for the few remaining mino-
rity prerogatives under any circumstances but for Stalin to
have achieved this degree of authority was disasterous. His
interpretation of federalism was no different from absolute
unity. At the time that the first constitution was issued
in 1918, he had speculated on the form that the federal
system would take in actual operation,
"Military and naval affairs, foreign affairs,
railways, post and telegraph, currency, trade
agreements and general economic, financial
and banking policy will probably all come
within the nrovince of the Central Council
of People's Commissars, All other affairs,
and primaril:/- the methods of implementation
of general decrees, education, judicature,
administration, etc., will come within the
province of the regional Councils of People's
Commissars. "15
This interpretation left nothing to the nationalities ex-
cept to follow directions and ensure compliance.
While these centrist encroachments were in progress,
the party was developing some non-international trends. In
the Ukraine and Georgia, old Bolsheviks resented the in-
vasions on their local administration which Moscow made with
increasing frequency,-*-" The antagonisms mounted and over-
l^Stalin, Works
,
Vol. k, P. 72
^Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 266-276
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flowed in the winter of 1922. Stalin attempted to consoli-
date Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia into the Transcau-
casian Republic as a step toward formation of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Georgian Communists
deeply resented this maneuver, not because they were op-
posed to the Union itself, but rather on account of the
reduction in statuts for Georgia which federation into
Transcaucasia implied. Belorussia and the Ukraine were to
enter the Union directly. If Georgia did not, it amounted
to a declaration that Georgia was a second-rate nation.
During the debates, Lenin received telegrams and letters
from Georgia which complained of threats against Georgian
communists and requested an inquiry. Ordzhonikidze, one
of Stalin's accomplices was singled out as particularly
offensive. Two commissions were sent to Georgia to in-
vestigate. Dzerzhinsky, another of Stalin's close asso-
ciates, was sent first. Rykov, whose relations with Stalin
were not close, was later assigned a similar task. Rykov
returned first and reported to Lenin. There is no record
of what he said but it must have been unfavorable for Sta-
lin's cohorts. It may have in^uded the fact thpt Ordzho-
nikidze had administered a beating to one of his fellow
Georgian party members who opposed the unification plan. '
-^ibid., pp. 276-278. Lenin refers to this incident as
evidence of failure of the unification plan. (be~ow p. 110)
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This was the point beyond which Lenin allowed no one to go.
The party members were sacrosanct and violence toward them
was sacrilege. His purges of the party bad been ones of
expulsion and he had even been reluctant to execute the
1 ftTzarist police spy, Roman Malenovsky. Soon after Rykov's
report, Lenin dictated a condemnation of Stalin, Dzerzhinsky
and Ordzhonikidze.
That condemnation, written in December of 1922, is
presented here in full since it consists not only of an at-
tack on Stalin and his accomplices but also the admission
that the whole plan of centralization had been too rapid
and that severe abuses had resulted. For a Nationalist, it
also demonstrates that the communist -party cannot even pro-
tect minorities among its own membership.
"THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES OR MAUT0N0?'ISATI0N"
.
I suppose I have been very remiss with respect to
the workers of Russia for not having intervened
energetically and decisively enough in the noto-
rious question of autonomisation, x^hich, it ap-
pears, is officially called the question of the
union of Soviet socialist republics.
When this question arose last summer, I was ill;
and then in autumn I relied too much on my reco-
very and on the October and December plenary meet-
ings giving me an opportunity of intervening in
this question. However, I did not manage to attend
the October Plenary Meeting (when this question
came up) or the one in December, and so the ques-
tion passed me by almost completely.
lojohn S. Reshetar, -Jr., A Concise History of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (New York//.;ashington/London:
Frederick A, Praeger, publishers, 196k) p. 218
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I have only had time for a talk with Comrade Dzerzhin-
sky, who came from the Caucasus and told me how this
matter stood in Georgia, I have also managed to ex-
change a few words with Comrade Zinoviev and express
my apprehensions on this matter. Prom what I was told
by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who was at the head of the
commission sent by the C.C. to "investigate" the Geor-
gian incident, I could only draw the greatest appre-
hensions. If matters had come to such a pass that
Orjonikidze could go to the extreme of applying phy-
sical violence, as Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me,
we can imagine what a mess we have got ourselves in-
to. Obviously the whole business of "autonomisation"
was radically wrong and badly timed.
It is said that a united apparatus was needed. Where
did that assurance come from? Did it not come from
that same Russian anoaratus which, as I pointed out
in one of the preceding sections of my diary, we
took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with
Soviet oil?
There is no doubt that that measure should have been
dela:/ed somewhat until we could say that we vouched
for our apparatus as our own. But now, we must, in
all conscience, admit the contrary; the apparatus \<e
call ours is, in fact, still quite alien to us; it
is a bourgeois and tsarist hotch-potch and there has
been no possibility of getting rid of it in the course
of the past five years without the help of other coun-
tries and because we have been "busy" most of the
time with military engagements and the fight against
famine.
It is quite natural that in such circumstances the
"freedom to secede from the union" by which we justi-
fy ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable
to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that
really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in
substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical
Russian bureaucrat is. There is no doubt that the
infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised
workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic
Great-Russian riffraff like a fly in milk.
It is said in defence of this measure that the Peop-
le's Commissariats directly concerned with national
psychology and national education were set up as
separate bodies. But there the question arises: can
these Peoole's Commissariats be made quite indepen-
dent? and secondly: were we careful enough to take
measures to orovide the non-Russians with a real
safeguard against thr truly Russian bully? I do not
think we took such measures although we could and
should have done so.
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I think that Stalin's haste and his infatuation with
nure administration, together with his spite against
the notorious "nationalist-socialism", played a fa-
tal role here. In politics spite generally plays the
basest of roles.
I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, x^ho went to
the Caucasus to investigate the "crime" of thos "na-
tionalist-socialists", distinguished himself there
by his truly Russian frame of mind (it is common
knoi^ledge that -people of other nationalities who
have become Russified overdo this Russian frame of
mind) and that the impartiality of his whole com-
mission was typified well enough by Orjonikidze ' s
"manhandling". I think that no provocation or even
insult can justify such Russian manhandling and that
Comrade Dzerzhinsky was inexcusably guilty in adopt-
ing a light-hearted attitude towards it.
For all the citizens in the Caucasus Orjonikidze was
the authority. Or.ionikidze had no right to display
that irritability to which he and Dzerzhinsky referred.
On the contrary, Or jonikidze should have behaved with
a restraint which cannot be demanded of any ordinary
citizen, still less of a man accused of a "political"
crime. And, to tell the truth, those nationalist-so-
cialists were citizens who were accused of a politi-
cal crime, and the terms of the accusation were such
that it could not be described otherwise.
Here we have an important question of principle: how
is internationalism to be understood?
Lenin
December 30, 1022
Taken down by M.V.
Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922
THE QUESTION OP NATIONALITIES OR "AUT0N0"-uSATI0N" (cont.)
In my writings on the national question I have already
.said that an abstract presentation of the question of
nationalism in general is of no use at all. A distinc-
tion must necessarily be made between the nationalism
of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation,
the nationalism of a big nation and that of a small
nation.
In respect of the second kind of nationalism we, na-
tionals of a big nation, have nearly always been
guilty, in historic nractice, of an infinite number
of cases of violence; furthermore, we commit- violence
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and insult an infinite number of times without
noticing it. It is sufficient to recall my Volga
reminiscences of how non-Russians are treated;
how the Poles are not called by any other name
than Polyachishka how the Tatar is nicknamed
Prince, how the Ukrainians are always Khokhols
and the Georgians and other Caucasian Ir^Eionais
always Kapkasians
.
That is why internationalism on the t>art of op-
pressors or "great" nations, as they are called
(though they are great only in their violence,
only great as bullies), must consist not only
in the observance of the formal equality of na-
tions but even in an inequality of the oopressor
nation, the great nation, that must make up for
the inequality which obtains in actual practice.
Anybody who does not understand this has not
grasped the real proletarian attitude to the na-
tional question, he is still essentially petty
bourgeois in his point of view and is, therefore,
sure to descend to the bourgeois point of view.
What is important for the proletarian? For the pro-
letarian it is not only important, it is absolutely
essential that he should be assured that the non-
Russians nlace the greatest possible trust in the
proletarian class struggle. What is needed to en-
sure this? Not merely formal equality. In one way
or another, by one's attitude or by concessions,
it is necessary to compensate the non-Russians
for the lack of trust, for the suspicion and the
insults to which the government of the "dominant"
nation subjected them in the past.
I think it is unnecessary to explain this to Bol-
sheviks, to Communists, in greater detail. And I
think that in the present instance, as far as the
Georgian nation is concerned, we have a typical
case in which a genuinely proletarian attitude
makes profound caution, thoughtfulness and a readi-
ness to compromise a matter of necessity for us.
The Georgian who is neglectful of this aspect of
the question, or who carelessly flings about accusa-
tions of "nr tionalist-socialis t"
,
(whereas he him-
self is a real and true "nptionalist-socialist"
,
and even a vulg?r Great-Rus ~ian bully), violates,
in substance, the interests of proletarian class
solidarity, for nothing holds up the development
and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity
so much as national injustice; "offended" nationals
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are not sensitive to anything so much as to the
feeling of equality and the violation of this
equality, if only through negligence or jest -
to the violation of that equality by their pro-
letarian comrades. That is why in this case it
is better to overdo rather than underdo the con-
cessions and leniency tox^ards the national mino-
rities. That is why, in this case, the fundamen-
tal interest of proletarian solidarit?/, and con-
sequently of the proletarian class struggle, re-
quires that we never adopt a formal attitude to
the national question, but always take into ac-
count the specific attitude of the proletarian
of the oppressed (or small) nation towards the
oppressor (or great) nation.
Lenin
Taken down by M.V.
December 31. 1922?
Continuation of the notes.
December 31, 1922
What practical measures must be taken in the pre-
sent situation?
Firstly, we must maintain and strengthen the union
of socialist republics. Of this there can be no
doubt. This measure is necessary for us and it is
necessary for the world communist proletariat in
its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its
defence against bourgeois intrigues.
Secondly, the union of socialist republics must be
retained for its diplomatic apparatus. By the way,
this apparatus is an exceptional component of our
state apparatus. We have not allowed a single in-
fluential person from the old tsarist apparatus in-
to it. All sections with any authority are composed
of Communists. That is why it has already won for
itself (this may be said boldly) the name of a re-
liable communist apparatus purged to an incomparably
greater extent of the old tsarist, bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois elements than that which we have had
to make do with in .other People's Commissariats.
Thirdly, exemplary punishment must be inflicted on
Comrade Orjonikidze (I say this all the more regret-
fully as I am one of his personal friends and have
worked with him abroad) and the investigation of all
the material which Dzerzhinsky ' s commission has col-
lected must be completed or started over again to
correct the enormous mass of wrongs and biased judge-
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merits which it doubtlessly contains. The politi-
cal responsibility for all this truly Great-Rus-
sian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid
on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.
Fourthly, the strictest rules must be introduced
on the use of the national language in the non-
Russian republics of our union, and these ru'es
must be checked with special care. There is no
doubt that our apparatus being i>ihat it is,, there
is bound to be, on the pretext of unity in the
railway service, unity in the fiscal service and
so on, a mass of truly Russian abuses. Special
ingenuity is necessary for the struggle against
these abuses, not to mention special sincerity
on the part of those who undertake this struggle.
A detailed code will be required, and ori'j the
nationals living in the republic in question can
draw it up at all successfully. And then we can-
not be sure in advance that as a result of this
vjork vie shall not take a step backward at our
next Congress of Soviets, i.e., retain the union
of Soviet socialist republics only for military
and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects
restore full independence to the individual Peop-
le's Commissariats.
It must be borne in mind that the decentralisation
of the People's Commissar ia ts and the lack of co-
ordination in their work as far as Moscow and
other centres are concerned can be compensated suf-
ficiently by Part?/- authority, if it is exercised
with sufficient prudence and impartiality; the
harm that can result to our state from a lack of
unification between the national apparatus and the
Russian apparatus is infinitely less than that
which will be done not only to us, but to the whole
International, and to the hundreds of millions of
the peoples of Asia, which is destined to follow
us on to the stage of history in the near future.
It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the
eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awak-
ening, we underminded our prestige with its peoples,
even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice
towards our own non-Russian nationalities. The need
to rally against the imperialists of the West, who
are defending the capitalist world, in one thing.
There can be no doubt about that and it would be
superfluous for me to speak about my unconditional
approval of it. It is another thing when we our-
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selves lapse, even if only in trifles, into im-
perialist attitudes towards oppressed nationali-
ties, thus undermining all our principled sin-
cerity, all our principled defence of the struggle
against imp' rialism. But the morrow of world histo-
ry will be a day when the awakening peoples op-
pressed by imperialism are finally aroused and the




Taken down by M.V." 19
Lenin's illness prevented him from personally confronting
Stalin and the others. He instrusted the prosecution to
Trotsky who failed to carry out the instructions. ° Why
Trotsky refused to use this weapon against Stalin at the
time may never be known. When he did attempt to use it in
192?, Stalin referred to the accusation as "tittle-tattle"
and stated that the incident was insignificant. *- Without
the help of Lenin or Trotsky, the communists from the mino-
rities had no hope of preventing Stalin's new plans. At the
Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, he dismissed the Georgian
opposition as "not all there in their upper storeys" and
blamed chauvinism of both the Great Russian and local variety
PP
on the N.E.P. Self-determination was thrown out.
"There are instances when the right to self-deter-
mination comes into conflict with another, higher
19Lenin, Collected Works
,
Vol. 36, pt>, 605-611
20Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union
,
p. 239
2lStalin, Works, Vol. 9, p. 68
22Stalin, Works, Vol. 5, PP. 236 and 301
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right - the right of the working class which
attained power, to fortify its power. In such
cases, it must be stated frankly the right of
self-determination, cannot be and must not
serve as an obstacle to the realization of the
right of the working class to its own dicta-
torship. The first must recede before the se-
cond. "23
A resolution for a constitution even more centrist than the
one which had caused the dispute was passed and the resul-
tant decree included the introduction of a second chamber
of national representatives into the Supreme Soviet. M- This
moved Stalin's entire Commissariat of Nationalities and its
associated Soviet directly into the U.S.S.R.'s government
apparatus on an equal basis. Passage of only Stalin's le-
gislation was assured. When Lenin died in l°2l_j., Stalin
chanted his litany of praise and vowed allegiance to the
Marxist-Leninist tradition. The fourth article of that creed
must have caused deep despair for party members from the
minorities
.
"Departing from us, Comrade Lenin en.ioined us
to strengthen and extend the Union of Repub-
lics. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that this
behest, too, we shall fulfill with honour, "2$
23Stalin, Works
,
Vol. 5, p. 270
^Batsell, op.cit. , pp. 301-320. The decree and con-
stitution which resulted both appear.
25stalin, 'Works, Vol. 6, p. £l
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Stalin might as well have declared his coronation as Tzar
of all the Russia's.
Lenin's death and the subsequent ratification of the
Stalinist constitution ended the paper war against both
party and non-party nationalists. Stalin had begun the pro-
cess of building a socialist nation according to his own de-
finition of the term. The constitution provided the base
of common territory and economic bond. The super structural
problems of culture and language were attacked next. In a
speech at a meeting of the students of the University of
the Peoples of the East in May of 1925, he announced the
formula of proletarian in content and national in form as
the ideal for a socialist state. The declaration is a fair-
ly accurate rendition of Marx's statement that the struggle
of the proletariat x^ith the bourgeoisie would be national
in form but not in substance. " Stalin's "new" theory soon
proved as faulty in application as had earlier Marxist-Leni-
nist policies on the national question. When efforts were
made at permitting the use of national languages in education,
they proved to be a divisive force and infusion of socialist
principles was of little help. Knowledge of language led to
investigations of national literature, history, philosophy




and tradition, all of which were replete with non-Marxist
ideas. National pride received new impetus and animosity
toward the Great-Russian Communist party grew. In the Ukraine,
attempts were even made to Ukrainianize Russian Communists.
After a full scale battle of words between Russians and mi-
nority groups at a meeting of the All-Union Central Execu-
tive Committee in 1926, Stalin dispatched a letter to the
Ukraine which condemned their non-Marxist cultural activi-
27ties. ' It marked the beginnings of the real onslaught
against national language and culture. ^8 Stalin, who may
have had some thought of Russian as the common language in
a multi-lingual state before these events, chose to support
complete Russification of the minorities .9
Collectivization of the peasantry and the assault on
national cultures and language led to rising opposition and
Stalin called a temporary halt in 1930. The article, Dizzy





"a full description of the battle between the Ukrainians
and Moscow over the language issue is contained in John S.
Reshetar's "National Deviation in the Soviet Union" in The
American Slavic and i7ast r urorean Review, -or). l62- 1 7li. The
final "defeafcame in l c 33 when the Ukrainian writer Xhvylovy
and the old-Bolshevik Skrypnyk, also a Ukrainian and minister
of education, committed suicide in protest to Russif ication.
"For a brief but comprehensive article on Russification
see Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus
(Chicago: Henry Reenery Company, 1Q&6) Chp. XVIII. Walter Ko-
larz, Russia and Her Colonies (London: George Philip and Son
Limited^ 1952) provides a more detailed account.
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Stalin's report at the Sixteenth Party Congress condemned
Great-Russian chauvinism as a national deviation. *v
"The essence of the deviation towards Great-
Russian chauvinism is an endeavour to ignore
national differences of language, culture and
mode of life; an endeavour to prepare the way
for the liquidation of the national republics
and regions; an endeavour to undermine the
principle of national equality and bring into
disrepute the Party policy of naturalising the
administrative apparatus, and of naturalising
the press, schools and other state and public
organisations . "31
This concession to the nationalists was followed by a
slight rejuvenation of efforts by some non-Russian com-
munists to retain and strengthen national culture among
the minorities. However, by 193U-* Stalin renewed the at-
tack. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 193U> both forms
of deviation came under fire,
"The deviation toward nationalism is the adap-
tion of the Internationalist policy of the
working class to the nationalist policy of
the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards na-
tionalism reflects the attempts of "One's
own national" bourgeoisie to undermine the
Soviet system and to restore capitalism.....
If you want to keep both these deviations
(Great-Russian nationalism and local nationa-
lism) under fire then aim primarily against
this source, against those who deoart from
internationalism - regardless of whether
3°J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1953) p. lj-19





the deviation is towards local nationalism
or toward Great-Russian nationalism. "32
By citing both forms of nationalism as dangerous, Stalin
gave the Great-Russians a free hand since they dominated
both the party and government. Wo more was heard of the de-
viation toward Great-Russian chauvinism.
During World War II, the Nazi inv-sion provided an
example of how well Stalin's policy had worked. Ukrainians,
Chechens, Ingushi, Kalmyks, Karachi and Balkars welcomed
the Germans. Only Hitler's own racist policies prevented
his forces from receiving continued support from these people. 3*
When Soviet troops regained these territories, massive de-
portations occurred,^ Stalin could not afford to have these
3 2stalin, Problems of Leninism
, p. 61|.0
33Roman Smal-Stocki, The Captive Nations (New York:
Bookman Associates, I960) pp. 65-75. Smal-Stocki indicates
that the following peoples fought with Germany against the
USSR










3^-R. Conquest, The Soviet Deportations of Nationalities
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., I960). The number of depor-
tations has been subject of much argument. Conquest estimates
81}., 000 for the Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechen and Ingushi,
Karachi and Balkars. The total amounted to a depopulation of
about 60,000 sq. miles. All Ukrainians did not escape as Khrush-
chev insinuated. About 1,000,000 were deported (Ibid., p. 6°)
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nationalities in the rear of his army. Khrushchev later ad-
mitted that the Ukraini,?n nation as a whole escaped this
fate because of sheer numbers. -^
The conflict between Lenin and Stalin over the na-
tional policy was purely a matter of tactics. Both men wanted
the same goals and, as Lenin's memorandum indicates, he only
believed that autonomization had been too rapid. The impor-
tant a
x
uestion is whether his reform would have xvorked or
not and the anti-faction party doctrine seems to indicate
that it would not. There was scarcely any protection for na-
tional rights in the state organization from the time of
the first constitution. The federal decrees themselves were
initiated by Moscow without participation by a third execu-
tor. It was the equivalent of France establishing a federa-
tion of Western Europe by announcing that its constitution
applied throughout the area. The difference was that Moscow
had enough strength to enforce the declaration on the na-
tionalities,
Lenin's reform called for a return of all commissariats
except military and foreign affairs to the republics but
there is no mention of provisions for national blocs in par-
35>N. Khrushchev, "Address At The Twentieth Party Congress"
in The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism
,
a
selection of Documents edited by the Russian Institute Colum-
bia University (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) p. 57.
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ty disputes. Instead, they are specifically precluded by
the anti-faction policy. This meant that none of the na-
tional minority parties -could form a group of representa-
tives at a party congress in order to oppose a Great-Rus-
sian policy. "Tven a two member group was subject to a charge
of building factions and d estroying party harmony. Further-
more, Democratic-Centrism demanded that all lower echelons
carry out the decisions of the higher organs so Moscow
still controlled in all the regions. There was no protec-
tive mechanism built in and retention of the military pro-
vided the strength of arms to back up Great-Russian policy
if necessary.
All of Lenin's efforts to provide organizational uni-
ty, to achieve cooperation and to avoid coercion were doomed
to failure. The single most important ingredient, volition
,





Rents and Patches in the Monolith
In the decade from 19k3 until 1953, Stalin followed
a script in Eastern Eurone which was only a slight revision
of the tragedy which the Bolsheviks had written during the
pre-war years in the U.S.S.R. The minor actors were changed
and a new title, "People's Democracy" , was added but the
main theme remained intact. It is usually dangerous to re-
view history and draw close parallels since distortions
frequently result. However, in this case, there is a pre-
ponderance of evidence to .justify such an analysis.
1. Stalin, the nationalities expert, was the di-
recting influence during both periods.
2. World War resulted in similar circumstances
during both periods.
3. The Red Army or Communist forces occupied
Eastern Europe as they had in Russia and
the borderlands in 1920-21.
k. Agrarian economies and countries with limited
democratic experience were involved in both
instances,
1
Perhaps the strongest argument for similarity is the fact
that the policy was being devised and executed by avowed
•^-The Czechs were an obvious exception to this condition.
They also survived for the longest -oeriod as a coalition go-
vernment. A concise history of the countries of "astern iuror^e
between l°lS and 19k £ is available in H. Seton-Watson, "astern




Marxists, immersed in historical analysis and preoccupied
with the application of historically relevant categories.
Further investigation reveals that many of the same strate-
gic errors were made.
When Germany had threatened to destroy the Bolsheviks
in 1918, the demonstrative diplomatic ploy was peace with-
out annexations and self-determination. On the 2iith Anni-
versary of the October Revolution in 191+1, Stalin declared
that the Soviet Union did not and could not have war aims
which would include seizure of foreign territories or the
_ 2
subjugation of foreign peoples in either Europe or Asia.
A year later on the same occassion, his speech repeated
these anti-annex? tionist assertions and included the as-
surance that national sovereignty would be restored along
with the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it
wished.-^ By November of 19^3, the war was progressing much
better and, although Stalin was still leaning heavily on
national rights, he had some snecific peoples whom he hoped
would benefit from Soviet democracy.
"Together with our allies we shall have to:
1. Liberate the peoples of Europe from the fas-
cist invaders and help them reconstitute
2 Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union (New York: International Publishers, ic l|-i?) p~] 33"
"
3 Ibid., p. 73
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their national states, dismembered by the
fascist enslavers - the -peoples of Prance,
Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Greece ^nd other states, which are under
the German yoke, must again become free and
independent;
2. give the liberated -oeoples of Europe the
full right and freedom to decide for them-
selves the question of their form of go-
vernment
;
3. take measures to inflict severe punishment
and retribution for all the crimes they
committed on all the fascist criminals,
who are responsible for the present war
and the suffering of the peonies;
ij.. establish such an order in Europe that
would completely exclude the possibility
of new aggression on the part of Germany;
5. create long-term economic, political, and
cultural collaboration among the nations
of Europe, based on mutual trust and mu-
tual aid, for the purpose of rehabilita-
ting the economies and cultures destroyed
by the Germans, "k
Stalin intended to "liberate" Poland according to his own
terms. The Katyn Forest incident had served as an excuse to
sever diplomatic relations with the Polish government exiled
in London. A Polish Committee of National Liberation was
established in l°kk. It consisted of an amalgamation of
the Polish "Workers Party (Communist), which had remained
in Poland during the war, and the Union of Polish Patriots,
a Moscow sponsored group,--' The Polish National Committee
^Ibid.
, pp. 105-106
^Vaclav Benes et al., Eastern European Government and




(Lublin Government) marched into Poland behind the Red
Army just as Pyatakov had in the Ukraine in 1918. Stalin
announced his intentions to President Roosevelt in a mes-
sage on December 27, 19l±ij..
"I have to say frankly that if the Polish Com-
mittee of National Liberation will transform
itself into a Provisional Polish Government
then, in view of the above- said, the Soviet
Government will not have any serious ground
for postponement of the question of its re-
cognition. It is necessary to bear in mind
that in the strengthening of a oro-Allied
and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is
interested more than any other power not
only because the Soviet Union is bearing
the main brunt of the battle for liberation
of Poland but also because Poland is a bor-
der state with the Soviet Union and the prob-
lem of Poland is inseparable from the prob-
lem of security of the Soviet Union. "6
The U.S.S.R. recognized the Lublin government on the eve
of the Yalta conference, ' Roosevelt and Churchill were pre-
sented with a fait accomoli and there was little which
could be done because of the need to pursue the war with
Germany and Jaoan,"
kjcseoh Stalin, Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee,
Roosevelt and Truman 19L1-115" ( London; Lawrence and WisTTaFt,
19£b) Vol. II, Document No. 25L, p. l8l.
?Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Ed., The Foreign Policy of the
Soviet Union (New York; Random House, 1960) p. 1°6~ Declara-
tion on Soviet-Polish Relations - Tass Communique - January 10,
19li4 (USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 7 (191*4), p.l.
o
Churchill surmed uo the situation quite well with the
question, "What would have har>oened if we had quarrelled with
Russia while Germany still had two or three hundred divisions
on the fighting front?" in V/inston 3. Churchill, Triumph and
Tragedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1°62) p. 3kS»
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The idea of security for the Soviet Union appeared
again at the Potsdam Conference in 19W. Stalin, with his
usual tact, declared:
"Any freely elected government in these coun-
tries the former German satellites in the
Balkans will be an anti-Soviet government
and we cannot allow that, "9
The national sovereignty of Rumania, Bulgaria end Hungary
were subject to conditions which favored Moscow, Stalin
might have said that the interests of the proletariat some-
times over-ruled self-determination as he had in 192l±.
With Communist forces in firm control, Stalin lapsed
into an ominous silence on the subject of Eastern Europe
after 19i|5. This fact alone is indicative of the leek of
ideological significance in the doctrine of "people's Demo-
cracy" which was adopted to describe the new acquisitions.
Definitions of the term were left to Soviet scholars or
Party leaders in the countries themselves. Without a defi-
nitive statement from the center, there x-jere a variety of
attempts at stating just what the new form of government
was. About the only agreement was that it had some proleta-
rian content, was definitely not the dictatorship of the
proletariat and was not similar to Soviet "democracy". *0
^Philip S. Mosely, "Across the Green Table from Stalin",
Current History (Philadelphia: Current History Inc., 19li8) p.131,
l°Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York:
Frederick A. praeger, Publisher"! 1961) pp. 2 7-32.
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Lenin could have defined it for them. It was a temporary
alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie, a transitional period
for the building of socialism and a period of allowing some
capitalism while the party consolidated its position.
Eastern Europe was experiencing its N.E.P.
Stalin held firm to the old policy line. Party unity
was not a serious problem. In addition to the Red military
presence, his own people controlled the majority of the lo-
cal Communist Parties in Eastern Europe and the secret po-
lice were actively ferreting out "fascists". Democratic-
centralism and anti-f ~ ctionalism were still in effect. The
old Commissariat of Nationalities was not available to act
as a subversive state unification vehicle but this was easi-
ly remedied. A series of friendship and mutual aid agreements
served just as well. ^ In 1926, the formula of socialist in
content and national in form had marked the beginnings of
the drive for cultural orthodoxy. The establishment of the
Cominform in 19147 fulfilled this function and -orovided
for even greater party unity. Soon after the Cominform was
founded, economic plans similar to Stalin f s 1928 project




pt>, 108-118. Brzezinski has reduced the more
than'^O treaties to a matrix format.
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emphasis. There was even a device similar to the Trans-
caucasian federation in the offing. In 1922-23, Stalin had
welded the peoples of the Caucasus together prior to incor-
poration. This maneuver might be best described as "unite
and conquer". The conflicts between Georgians , Azerbaidjanians
and Armenians over the federation had weakened the opposition
to Moscow which any of these nationalities might have been
able to m^unt as individuals. Moscow had been able to con-
trol with a minimum of exertion and to take the role of bene-
volent protector and arbiter of intra-federative disputes.
In 191-1-7, Tito's Yugoslavia and Hoxha's Albania were scheduled
for the same treatment as Is evident from Albania's consioi-
cious absence from Cominform membership. Tito's aid to Greece
would indicate that Macedonia was nrobably also slated for
the Balkan federation and part of Bulgaria may have been on
the list as x^ell. At this point, Stalin's plan miscarried.
Just as in 1923, when too rapid a pace had almost cost him
his party oost, he oushed Tito too hard. Tito was also a na-
tionality expert and the nart he was being assigned to "nlay
in the Balkans was shaping uo to be a little too much like
that of the Georgians. He xvas certainly in favor of in-
•^Adaro B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York/
Washington: 5'rederick A. Fraeger, Publishers, 1968) p. Ii63
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creasing Yugoslav holdings in the Balkans and federation
of the Soviet type under Tl^c- as an independent would have
increased his power immensely. However, if Stalin intended
to use the Balkan, federation in the same manner as the for-
mer Caucasus fiasco, Tito was in deep trouble. Once Moscow
moved toward unification, Tito would become one of a large
group of nationalist deviants unless he received special
treatment from Stalin, If unification were approaching, it
meant that Tito would have to trust in Stalin T s word that
Yugoslavia, with its newly federated territories, would re-
ceive a privileged position. In addition to the obvious
historical parallel indicating a trend toward thpt unifica-
tion, the whole subject had already been discussed, Sadchi-
kov, the ^oviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, had reported the
following conversation with Kardelj in June of 19i±5>.
"Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union
to regard them, not as representatives of
another country, capable of solving questions
independently, but as representatives of one
• of the future Soviet Republics, and the CPY
as a part of the All-Union Communist Party,
' that is, that our relations should be based
on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in
the future a constituent part of the USSR,
For this reason thev would like us to criti-
cize them frankly and openly and to give
them advice which i^ould direct the internal
and foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the
right path. "13
-^The Soviet- Yugoslav Dispute , Text of the published
correspondence (London and New York: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 19Ll8) p. 38
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Stalin, attempting to reassure Tito, quoted this statement
during the dispute which erupted in early 191+8 and denied
that there was a plan such as that to which Kardelj had re-
ferred. Tito was an old and experienced party man with a
powerful instinct for self-preservation. He was clever, had
been in Moscow during the purges, and he knew J.V. Stalin
well. Tito balked. Stalin tried to engineer his expulsion
and failed. Lenin's ill health and untimely death had allowed
Stalin to cover his tracks in 1923-2l± but Tito remained dis-
gustingly healthy and loquacious. The Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Flan -nrovided a way out and Tito took it at a dead
run. The cold war, which was providing the same false urgen-
cy as the capitalist encirclement propaganda of the 1920' s,
had backfired badly.
The defection was a major blow for Moscow but Stalin
continued with his schedule in the remainder of the Satellite
countries. He managed to make a little use of the setback.
When the time for the purge came, he was able to execute
Titoists instead of Trotzkyites. Stalin had used, oppressed
and subverted national movements for 30 years. The nationali-
ties finally had their day. It is impossible to say when
Stalin intended to execute his cons titutional couo in Eastern
Europe but it could not have been far away when the U.S. re-
armed for the Korean war. In 19^9 and 195>0, Hungary and Al-

13 q
bania adopted constitutions which are virtual conies of
the U.S.S.R, model. ^ The grand scheme died a slow death.
In 19^2, Rumania and Poland followed suit.
When Stalin died, the Kremlin began a concerted
effort at patching up the rift with Yugoslavia. Malenkov
began the campaign and Khrushchev continued it. In 1°~5,
the mountain went to Mohammed when Khrushchev visited Bel-
grade and hauled out all of the Leninist teachings on the
relations among socialist countries. His arrival speech
included the following passage.
"True to the teachings of the founder of the
Soviet state, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the go-
vernment of the Soviet Union bases its re-
lations with other countries, big and small,
on the principles of the peaceful co-existence
of states, on the orinciples of equality, non-
interference, respect for sovereignty and na-
tional independence, on the pr indoles of
non-aggression and recognition that any en-
croachments by states upon the territorial
integrity of other states are impermissible.
V/e hope that the relations between our coun-
tries will in the future too develoo on the
basis of these orinciples, for the good of
our oeoples."l5
-^H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist j-ast
Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966) p.ii9
-*-5n. Khrushchev, "Speech on Arrival at Belgrade, May 26,
1955" (English translation in S oviet News
,
May 27, 1955; re-
printed in Documents on International Affairs
, 1955, pp. 265-66)
in Robert V. Daniels, Ed # , A Documentary History of Communism
(New York: Random House, 1°60) pp. 22^-22!i. .
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The major move came in 1956 at the 20th Party Congress
when Khrushchev delivered the "secret" speech. 1° If Khrush-
chev believed he could, limit the implications of his ad-
dress to abolition of Stalinist excesses, he was sadly mis-
taken. In addition to the speech itself, Lenin's "Testa-
ment" and the Memorandum on Autonomiz r tion were both distri-
buted at the congress. ' Khrushchev had hung out thirty
years' accumulation of the Party's dirty laundry on a single
line. These events and Khrushchev's earlier visit to Eel-
grade combined to create the appearance that recalcitrance
was not only permis sable but laudatory. It seemed as though
he actually intended to deal with other national parties on
an equal basis and to adopt the Leninist advice of 1922.
Then, Imre Nagy went too far. He attempted to guarantee
Khrushchev's promise of independence with a decree of neu-
trality, repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty and a request for
United Nations protection. The Red Army invaded and Kagy
paid with his life. ^ The fantasy of equality, sovereignty
loN. Khrushchev, "Secret Soeech on the "Cult of the
Individual," delivered at the Twentieth Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, February 25, 1956, in The




*-'The articles were also published in Kommunist No. 9,
June 30, op. 15-26 in The Current Digest of the Soviet press
,
Vol. IX, p. li}.-2[i_. The testament is included in Ao-aendix A of
this essay for convenience. The memorandum is included above
on op. 110-116.




and self-determination went up in the smoke rising from
Budapest.
Tito, while heading for cover in the camp of the ca-
pitalist, bourgeois, imperialist exploiters of the West,
told Khrushchev what he thought of his "new" doctrine.
"From the very beginning, we said that here
it was not merely the question of the cult
of personality but, rather, the question of
a system which made the creation of the cult
of personality possible, that it was neces-
sary to strike at the roots unceasingly and
persistently - and this is most difficult...
... The Soviet leaders had a different atti-
tude toward other countries. They had cer-
tain wrong and defective views on relations
with these countries - with Poland, Hungary
and others. "19
The 1957 world-wide conference of Communist Parties marked
the return to unyielding doctrinal orthodoxy and both China
and the U.S.S.R. condemned Tito. 20
After 1957, the maneuvering of the various Communist
Parties became an incredible contest of one-ups-manship.
Khrushchev's speech and the documents which were issued in
1956 had destroyed the C.P.S.U.'s legitimacy as the leader
of the Communist World. If Lenin's analysis of Stalin was
-^Meter Dux, Ed., Ideology in Conflict (Princeton, N. J. :
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc
.
, 1963) po. 44-4&
20Decl?ration of the Conference of Representatives of
Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, Moscow,
November, 1957 (English" translation in The Current Direst of
the Soviet Press
,




correct, the U.S.S.R. hpd been building something other
than socialism or communism for thirty years. Theoretical-
ly, they were no more advanced than the most recent new-
comers. China announced the "Great Leap Forward" in January
of 1958 and followed this with the "Communes" in August of
p-i
that year. x The Chinese leadership declared that they
would soon achieve "Communism". Khrushchev countered by
pointing out that China lacked industry at the Twenty-First
Party Congress in 1Q59 and declared the U.S.S.R. was en-
tering the period of "all-out building of a Communist So-
ciety". ^ The centrifugal forces which Khrushchev had en-
couraged proved strong and this type of ideological warfare
has never ceased. Brezhnev's recent unifying efforts at the
1969 International Conference were hopeless from the be-
21Liu, "Report on the Work of the CCP Central Committee"
delivered to the Second Session of the Eighth National Con-
gress of the Chinese Communist Party, May 5, 1958 (official
translation reprinted in Current Background
,
No. 507, June 2,
1958, pp. 7-13, 1Q -21, 23-25) in Daniels, op.cit.
, pp. 367-37U.
Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, "On the Establishment of People's Communes in the Ru-
ral Areas", August 29, 1958 (English translation in Survey of
China Eainl-nd Press
,
U.S. Consul- te-Gener a 1, HongKong, No.
1853, Sentember l r- , 1958, pp. 1-2, Ij.) in Daniels, oo .cit. ,
pp. 37l|-377.
??fc N.Khrushchev, Political Re ort to the Twenty-First
Congress of the CFSU, January, 1959 (English translation in
U.S. Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report - Surrolement: US :'R and ^astern Europe
, No. 3, 19^°, ~c.






ginning. ^ He was even unable to obtain agreement on "im-
perialism". The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a clear
statement that his policies differ not in the least from
those of Stalin or Khrushchev. The title of "Limited So-
vereignty" aptly describes the situation to which Husak,
the new Czechoslovak First Secretary, referred at the con-
ference,
"Our experience in the past year and a half, the
speaker went on, reaffirms the fact that the so-
vereignty of the Communist Parties and socialist
countries includes the right of each to deter-
mine, in accordance with national conditions,
the forms and methods of socialist construction,
as well as its duty to be fully responsible to
its people for this. However, the guaranteeing
of the sovereignty of each party and socialist
country at the same time obliges them to uphold
and defend the power of the working class and
all the working people and all the revolutionary
gains of the socialist svstem. In this sense,
the class content of the sovereignty of the
socialist state is inextricably bound ud with
international responsibility to the common-
wealth of socialist countries and the interna-
tional Communist and revolutionary movement.
Our own expr rience shows, he went on to say,
that the slogan of sovereignty, stripped of its
class content, is a refined and very effective
weapon of the right-opportunist, revisionist
and antisocialist forces. This happens when the
party does not carry out a consistent Marxist-
Leninist policy and fails to wage a resolute
23i'he preparatory conference in 1968 did not go well.
The only resolution which emerged was a declaration for a
North Vietnam bombinc halt. See World Marxist Review, Vol. 11
No. l|., Aoril 1968 (Toronto, Canada: Progress Books) p. $.
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and consistent struggle in all spheres against
any manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. "2\\.
Rumania's foreign-news weekly I .urne
a
aptly described wh^t
many of the Parties think about Brezhnev's doctrine.
"Limited Sovereignty makes no more sense than
limited honesty. "25
Leonid Brezhnev's interpretation of Stalin's theory of in-
dependence and self-determination is superb but it will not
unify international Communism, Nationalism has resulted in






The many variants and differences of opinion are evident
from the following table.
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Can anyone unify the communist camp? There are only
two -possibilities open. Absolute power and authority might
achieve unification of the old Stalinist brand. However,
China's size, population and demonstrated military abili-
ties in conventional or guerilla warfare tend to indicate
that Moscow cannot achieve dominance over Peking by force.
Moscow's nuclear might -precludes domination by Peking. The
preponderance of force which the Western States could bring
to bear on either of the contestants is an additional se-
rious problem for any such plan. A Party conflict in either
country which would result in a leadership more ready to
accomodate the other also seems unlikely. Such ideological
accomodations cannot be made so readily any longer because
other Communist Parties immediately charge gross revisionism.
The second possibility, organization on a basis of
equity is possible but both unlikely and of little worth to
the communist camp. When Lenin founded the Party, his in-
sistence on active promotion of revolution and on dedicated,
professional revolutionaries meant that he was, in fact,
instituting a quasi-military oraganization. In order for
such a system to function efficiently it must be hierarchi-
cally organized. Otherwise, neither strategic nor tactical
effectiveness can be assured. Such an organization can be
achieved on a volitional basis only if there is" unanimity
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at all levels as to both goal and means. The second fac-
/ -
tor is obviously lacking among the various Communist Par-
ties. A decentralized, fraternal system includes no guaran-
tee of effectiveness for want of the same type of agree-
ment.
For the non-communist nationalist, the fact that
communism has shattered is only a partial solution to the
threat of communist take-over in that the presence of se-
veral differing theories has caused "in country" party
splits. The rift does not prevent either of the contesting
giants or lesser parties from continuing their policies of
subversion nor does it exclude the founding of entirely new
regimes by local unanimous communists. Unfortunately, at-
tempts to do so will continue. Marxist-Leninist Communism
has proven to be a superb vehicle for seizing and retaining
state power. It also confers some sort of questionable legi-
timacy on the totalitarian apparatus.
The true nationalist who fulfills the characteristics
enumerated by Shafer cannot adopt the communist model. The
previous discussion indicated th^t under a communist regime
there is no provision for:
1. Territorial integrity
2. Common culture
It is subject to annexa-
tion.
Internationalist culture
according to the model of
the dominant party is re-






6. Love for fellow nationals
7. Devotion to the nation
8. Common pride in achieve-
ments
9. Disregard for or hostility
toward othrr like groups
10. Hope for a great and glo-
rious national future.
Social institutions are
limited to those receivinf
Party approval. Others are




tates that history is ac-
cidental. It m?y also be re-
vised by decree.
Love does not involve surging
nor class struggle. Placing
fellow nationals under the
direct threat of foreign in-
tervention is not love.
The nation is bourgeois, tem-




before socialism and due
entirely to the initiative
of the party after the revo-
lution.
Communism seems to be ful-
filling this condition sd-
mirabl:/- at present. In the
ideal Marxist model, hosti-
lity should not exist.
The nation will ce^.se to
exist.
There is one further consideration. Khrushchev's efforts to
return to Leninism were a complete failure. Brezhnev's U.S.S.R.
does not seem to be even attempting a reform. The absence of
true Marxist-Leninism in the Great-Russian dominated apparatus
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of the U.S.S.R. indicates that there is an urgent need to
prevent Russian encroachments if true communism is to be
achieved anywhere. Fven China has experienced this -oroblem.
The local communist would seem well advised to acce-ot a
Western form of government as an interim measure since the
various so-called communist regimes have proven woefully
lacking in their ability to prevent outside interference.
When the establsihed regimes prove their mutual compatibili-
ty and economic differences among the various communist coun-
tries have ceased to exist because true, Marxist equality has
been achieved, they should have such a preponderance of
strength and, as Fngels said, the beneficial exemplary force
emitted by this new and marvelous state of affairs should be
such that the revolutionary task will become immeasurably
easier elsewhere. Farly revolt and the subsequent pressures
exerted by distorted Marxism can only lead to further na-




LETTER TO THF. CONGRESS
I x^ould urge strongly that at this Congress a number
of changes be made in our political structure.
I want to tell you of the considerations to which I
attach most importance.
At the head of the list I set an increase in the num-
ber of Central Committee members to a few dozen or even a
hundred. It is my opinion that without this reform our Cen-
tral Committee would be in great danger if the course of
events were not quite favourable for us (and that is some-
thing x^e cannot count on)
,
Then, I intend to propose that the Congress should on
certain conditions invest the decisions of the State Plan-
ning Commission with legislative force, meeting, in this
respect, the wishes of Comrade Trotsky - to a certain ex-
tent and on certain conditions.
As for the first point, i.e., increasing the number
of C.C, members, I think it must be done in order to raise
the prestige of the Central Committee, to do a thorough job
of improving our administrative machinery and to prevent
confict between small sections of the C.C. from acquiring
excessive importance for the future of the Party.
It seems to me that our Party has every right to de-
mand from the working class ^0 to 100 C.C. members, and that
it could get them from it without unduly taxing the resour-
ces of that class.
Such a reform would considerably increase the stabili-
ty of our Party and case its struggle in the encirclement of
hostile states, which, in my opinion, is likely to, and must,
become much more acute in the next few years, I think that




Taken down by M. V,
Continuation of the notes,
December 2k, 1922
By stability of the Central Committee, of which I spoke
above, I mean measures against a split, as far as such measures
can at all be taken. For, of course, the whiteguard in Russ-
kaya Mysi (it seems to have been S.S. Oldenburg) was right
when, first, in the whiteguards ' game against Soviet Russia he
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banked on a split in our Party, and when, secondly, he
banked on grave differences in our Part?/ to cause a split.
Our Party relies dh two classes and therefore its
instability would be possible and its downfall inevitable
if there were no agreement between those two classes. In
that event this or that measure, and generally all talk
about the stab^i^ity of our C.C., would be futile. No mea-
sures of any kind could -prevent a split in such a case. But
I hope that this is too remote a future and too improbable
an event to talk about.
I have in mind stability as a guarantee against a
split in the immediate future, and I intend to deal here
with a few ideas concerning personal qualities,
I think that from this standpoint the prime factors
in the question of stability are such members of the C.C.
as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make
up the greater part of the danger of a split, which could
be avoided, and this -cur-nose, in my opinion, would be served,
among other things, by increasing the number of C.C. mem-
bers to 50 or 100,
Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has
unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not
sure whether he will always be capable of using that autho-
rity with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other
hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of
the People's Commissariat for Co-_munications has already
proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability.
He is personally perhaos the most caoable man in the pre-
sent C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance
and shown excessive -oreoccupation with the purely administra-
tive side of the work.
These two qualities of the two outstanding leaders of
the present C.C. can inadvertently lead to a split, and if
our Party does not take steos to avert this, the solit may
come unexpectedly,
I shall not give en-7 further appraisals of the per-
sonal qualities of other members of the C.C. I shall .just
recall that the October episode with Zinoviev a Y d Kamenev
was, of course, no accident, but neither can the blame for
it be laid upon them personally, any more than non-Bolshe-
vism can upon Trotsky.
Speaking of the young C.C. members, I wish to say a
few words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. They are, in my
opinion, the most outstanding figures (among the youngest
ones), and the following must be borne in mind about them:
Bukharin is not only a most valuable and major theorist
of the Party; he is also rightly considered the favourite
of the whole party, but his theoretical views can be classi-
fied as fully Marxist only with great reserve, for there is
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something scholastic about him (he has never made a study of
dialectics, and, I think, never fully understood it).
December 2£. As for Pyatakov, he is unquestionably a
man of outstanding will and outstanding ability, but shows
too much zeal for administrating and the administrative side
of the work to be relied upon in a serious political matter.
Both of these remarks, of course, are made only for
the present, on the assumption that both these outstanding
and devoted Party workers fail to find an occasion to enhance
their knowledge and amend their one-sidedness.
Lenin
December 2£, 1922
Taken down by M. V.
ADDITION TO THE LETTER OF DECEMBER 2k, 1922
Stalin is too rude and this defect, although quite
tolerable in our midst and in dealings among us Communists,
becomes intolerable in a Secretary-General. That is why I
suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing
Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his strad
who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in
having only one advantage, namely, that of being more to-
lerant, more lo?,ral, more oolite and more considerate to the
comrades, less capricious, etc. This circumstance may ap-
pear to be a negligible detail. But I think that from the
standpoint of safeguards against a split and from the stand-
point of what I wrote above about the relationship between
Stalin and Trotsky it is not a detail, or it is a detail
which can assume decisive importance.
Lenin
Taken down by L.P.
January Ij., 1923
Continuation of the notes.
December 26, 1922
The increase in the number of C.C. members to ^0 or
even 100 must, in my opinion, serve a double or even a treble
purpose: the more members there are in the C.C., the more
men will be trained in C.C. work and the less danger there
will be of a split due to some indiscretion. The enlistment
of many workers to the C.C. will help the \>rorkers to irrcorove
our administrative machinery, which is pretty bad. We in-
herited it, in effect, from the old regime, for it was abso-
lutely impossible to reorganise it in such a short time,
especially in conditions of war, famine, etc. That is why
those"critics" who point to the defects of our administra-
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tive machinery out of mockery or malice may be calmly
answered that they do not in the le c^ st understand the con-
ditions of the revolution today. It is altogether impos-
sible in five years to reorganise the machinery adequate-
ly, especially in the conditions in which our revolution
took place. It is enough that in five years we have created
a new type of state in which the workers are leading the
peasants against the bourgeoisie; and in a hostile inter-
national environment this in itself is a gigantic achieve-
ment. But knowledge of this must on no account blind us to
the fact that, in effect, we took over the old machinery
of state from the tsar and the bourgeoisie and that now,
with the onset of peace and the satisfaction of the minimum
requirements against famine, all our work must be directed
towards improving the administrative machinery.
I think that a few dozen workers, being members of
the C.C., can deal better than anybody else with checking,
improving and remodelling our state apparatus. The Workers'
and Peasants' Inspection on whom this function devolved at
the beginning proved unable to cone with it and can be used
only as an "appendage" or, on certain conditions, as an
assistant to these members of the C.C. In my opinion, the
workers admitted to the Central Committee should come pre-
ferably not from among those who have had long service In
Soviet bodies ( in this part of my letter the term workers
everywhere includes peasants), because those workers have
already aca_uired the very traditions and the very prejudi-
ces which it is desirable to combat.
The working-class members of the C.C. must be mainly
workers of a lower stratum than those promoted in the last
five years to work in Soviet bodies; they must be people
closer to being rank-and-file workers and peasants, who,
however, do not fall into the category of direct or indi-
rect exploiters. I think that by attending all sittings of
the C.C. and all sittings of the Political Bureau, and by
reading all the documents of the C.C., such workers can
form a staff of devoted supporters of the Soviet system,
able, first, to give stability to the C.C. itself, and se-
cond, to work effectively on the renewal and improvement of
the state apparatus,
Lenin
Taken down by L.P.
December 26, 1922




"Communism: A House Divided, A Faith Fragmented", Time
,
The
weekly newsmagazine, June 13, 1969.
"Message of solidarity", World Marxist R cviexj, Vol. 11, No, ]
April 1968. Toronto" Canada: progress Books.
Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman, The Communist Party Apparatus
.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966.
Batsell, Walter Russell, Soviet Rule in Russia . New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1929,
Bauer, Otto, Die National itaetenfrage und Die Sozialdemokra-
tie
.
Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 192^7
Benes, Vaclav et al., Eastern Furonean Government and Poli -
tics
.
New York/ Fvans ton/London: Harper and Row, Pub-
lishers, 1966.




Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict
.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961.




Conquest, R,, The Soviet Deportations of Nationalities
.
London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. , I960.
Daniels, Robert V., Fd. , A Documentary History of Communism
.
New York: Random House, I960
Dux, Dieter, Ideology in Conflict. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
NostrancPCo. Inc., T9?TJ7
Engels, Friedrich, Social ism: Utopian and Scientif ic in
Mendel, Arthur P. , Fd. , Jissential V/orks of Marxism
.
New York/Toronto/London: Bantam Books, 1961.
Gankin, Olga Hess, "The Bolsheviks and the Founding of the
Third International" in The Slavic and Past European
Review, Vol. XX, 191+1, pp. 88-101.

IkQ
y Gunawardhana, Theja, Khrushchevism
. Colombo, Ceylon: Swa-
deshi Printers, 1963.
J Husak, G., "Speech at the International Conference of Com-
munist and Workers' Parties", The Current Digest of
of the Soviet Press
,
Vol. XXI, No. 27.
/ Khrushchev, N. , "Address At The Twentieth Party Congress",
The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism.
.
a selection of Documents edited by the Russian Insti-
tute Columbia University. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1956.
Kolarz, Walter, Russia and Her Colonies
.
London: George
Phi 1 Ip and Son Limited, 1° 52
~
Lenin, V.I., Collected Works
.
London: Lawrence and Wishart.
36 Volumes.
Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia . New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 19517
Marx, Karl, A Contribut ion to the Critique of Political Eco -
nomy
.
New York: The International Library Publishing
Co., 190k.
Marx, Karl, (Engels, P., Ed.), Capital . Chicago, 111.: Charles
H. Kerr and Company, 190Q
. 3 volumes.
Marx, Karl, The Class Struggle in France , in Feuer, Lewis S,,
Ed, , Basic Writings on Politic s and Philosophy by Karl
Marx ana Friedrich Inge Is . Garden City, N. Y. : Double -
day ana Co., Inc., 1959.
Marx, Karl, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte , in
Feuer, Lev/is S.
,
Fd., Basic Writings on Politics and
Philosophy by Karl Marx n. a Priearich Lngels . Garden
City, N. Y. : D^ubleaay and Co., Inc., 1959".
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, The German Ideology . Mos-
cow: Progress Publishers, 196k.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, Manifesto of the Communist
Party. New York: International Publishers, 19kd.

150
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, The Russian Menace to
Europe, Blackstock, Paul W, and Hoselitz, Bert F. Eds.,
Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1952.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, Selected Correspondence
I8k6-l895
.
New York: International Publishers, 193E.
Mosely, Philip E., "Across the Green Table from Stalin",
Current Histor;/-
.
Philadelphia, Pa.: Current History,
Inc., I9I18.
Page, S.W., "Lenin, The National Question and the Baltic
States, 1917-19" in The American Slavic and East Euro -
pean Review
,
Vol. VII, No. 1, 19i+9, pp. 15-31.
Pipes, Richard E. , "The First Experiment in Soviet National
Policy: The Bashkir Republic (1917-1920)" in Russian
Review
,
Vol. IX, No. 1+" (October, 1950), pp. 3.0" -31°.
Pipes, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union . Cambridge,
Mas s . : Harvard University Press, 196/4.
Reshetar, John S., Jr., A Concise History of the Communist
part}/ of the Soviet Un ion. New York/ ;iashington/London
:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 196[|-.
Reshetar, John S., "National Deviation in the Soviet Union",
in The American Slavic and East European Review , 00.
162-1711.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Ed. , The Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Union. New York: Random House, 1Q50.
Schlesinger, Rudolf, Ed., The Nationalities Problem and So -
viet Administration
.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Limited, 19 561
Seton-V/atson, Hugh, Eastern Eurooe between the Wars, 1918 -
19iil, 3rd edition. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, lc62
Shafer, Boyd C., "Toward a Definition of Nationalism" in
James N. Rosenau, Ed. , International Politics and Fo -





Shaheem, Samad, The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of Na -
tional Self- Determinat ion . The Hague, bandung: v7.
Van Hoeve Ltd., 1956.
i Skilling, H. Gordon, The Governments of Communist F^st
Europe
.
New York! Thomas Y. Crowe 11 Co., 1°66^




j The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute . Text of the published corres-
pondence. London and Ncxv York: Royal Institute of In-
ternational Affairs, 1^1+8
.
Stalin, Joseph, Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roos e-
velt and Truman 19^-1-1'-
5
.
London: Lawrence and WisharlT,
1953. Vol. II, Document No. 2£k.
Stalin, Jose-oh, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
.
New York: International Publishers, 19/+5.
Stalin, Joseph, Marxism and the National and Colonial O.ues-
tion
.
New York : International publishers
.
Stalin, Joseph, Problems of Leninism . Moscow: Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1953.
Stalin, J. V., Works . Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing
House, 195."5
. 13 volumes.
Trotsky, Leon, Stalin, An Appraisal of the Man and his in-
fluence
.
New York and London: Harper and Brothers Pub-
lishers, l°Ij.l #
y Ulam, Adam B. , Expansion and Coexis tence. New York/Washing-
ton: Frederick A. Praeger , Publishers, 1968.
Wolfe, Bertram D. , Marxism. New York: The Dial Press, 196£.

;o? PAL.M












7 R 8 7
Thes i s
K277
11780
Kel logg
Communist and
nationalist.

